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After visiting Aasia Bibi, a convicted blasphemer, Governor Salman Taseer criticized the 
Blasphemy Laws and sought amendments in them to make them more transparent. In a 
matter of weeks, his own body guard, Mumtaz Qadri, killed the Governor. This chain of 
events led to some cautioned debate across different segments of the Pakistani society. This 
study looks at the discourse around the Laws after Taseer visited Aasia Bibi till the execution 
of Qadri. Columns from Dawn and the Daily Jang were analyzed in the study using the 
epistemic governance approach. As predicted by the theory, the study found a wide array of 
imageries and objects of epistemic work throughout the narratives. Differences and 
similarities between the findings from the two newspapers were recognized and 
contextualized in line with their targeted readership. Interestingly, the forms of governance 
and imageries were very similar between the two papers even though they catered to different 
segments of the society. The study also recognized the clashing and integration of different 
world cultures within the discourse around the Laws. Further findings include the observation 
of heroism and mythification of historical figures in the narratives. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
I haven’t killed or robbed anyone, but in the eyes of my country’s justice system I’ve done something 
much worse: I have blasphemed. It’s the crime of crimes, the supreme insult. —Aasia Bibi1 
 
The Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan have attracted much controversy due to their 
content and implications. Derived from the “English Common Laws,” they were first 
included in the ‘Indian Penal Code’ in 1860. Pakistan inherited them on its independence in 
1947 and included their revised version in the ‘Pakistan Penal Code’. They were first 
amended to declare Ahmadis, a subsect of Islam, as heretics. Later, provisions were added 
regarding blasphemy against Quran and the Prophet Muhammad. The punishment was also 
changed from life imprisonment to death penalty. In the almost 3 decades since the last 
amendment, the Laws have not changed. During this time, a total of 1335 Pakistanis have 
been accused of committing blasphemy (Amnesty International, 2016). While no one has 
been executed under the charge, at least 51 accused have been killed extra-judicially, 5 of 
them while in police custody (Julius 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan 2015, p.26). The Laws 
have been criticized by human rights groups, civil society members and even foreign 
governments but to no avail. Those who favor amendments to them insist that besides being 
vague and against the human rights discourse, they specifically target the minorities of the 
country. On the other hand, their proponents insist that they are a) a spiritual and b) an 
integral part of the ideology of Pakistan and hence cannot be amended.  
Debates on the Laws have been rare as they tend to be a sensitive and controversial 
topic. Their supporters, usually encompassing the religious groups, are easily offended and 
tend to react violently. As these groups hold significant street power, politicians have 
historically avoided debating on them. However, the misuse of the Laws (or indeed their use 
at all) has prompted many in the civil society to demand amendments to them. Citing 
Pakistan’s commitments to numerous Human Rights conventions, they argue that the Laws 
undermine basic human rights and target minority religions. They also insist that trials for 
blasphemy cases are not transparent due to the fear around conversations on the Laws. 
Judges, heading these cases, are said to come under pressure due to intimidation from the 
religious lobby within and outside the courts. Furthermore, it is also argued that the society 
stigmatizes a blasphemy accused and he/she fails to lead a normal life even if they are 
                                                          
1 Blasphemy: A memoir, Sentenced to death over a cup of water. Aasia Bibi’s autobiography. Please see (Bibi & 
Tollet 2013) 
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acquitted by the court. Most of these must relocate along with their families and embrace new 
identities due to danger to their lives.  
While the discourse around the Laws is usually avoided, a certain series of events 
brought them into the spotlight and offered much insight into the social constructs that 
embrace and enact these Laws. This saga pertains to a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi who was 
accused of blasphemy. Her case, and especially the events that followed, pushed both the 
proponents as well as the critics of the Laws to offer narratives in media for their stance on 
them. These narratives were captured for the study and analyzed in line with epistemic 
governance. 
On 14th of June 2009, Aasia Bibi walked to a field of falsa berries and started picking 
them along with other women of her village. It was a hot day and the exhausted women, soon 
enough, congregated around a well to drink water. When it was Aasia’s turn, she dipped the 
metal cup into the well, drank the water and dipped it again for a refill. It was then that one of 
the village woman started complaining that the ‘Christian’ Aasia had made the water of the 
well haram (forbidden for Muslims) (Bibi & Tollet 2013, p.20). An argument ensued in 
which, apparently, Aasia uttered derogatory remarks against the Prophet of Islam, 
Muhammad. The women, dismayed at the blasphemy, eventually contacted the village Imam 
(religious leader and the custodian of the mosque) who lodged an FIR2 against Aasia Bibi. 
The police arrested Aasia and presented her in the Session court3 which awarded her death 
penalty for committing blasphemy. 
Salman Taseer, the Governor of Punjab4 visited Aasia Bibi on November 20, 2010 
and announced that he would plead a presidential pardon for her. In a press conference held 
after the meeting, Taseer criticized the Laws and sought amendments to them. His press 
conference attracted the furor of the religious political parties and groups who protested 
against the proposed amendments. In later interviews to TV channels, Taseer termed the 
Laws ‘black laws’ and declared that they were man-made and had nothing to do with Islam. 
This was taken by many as blasphemy and street movements were initiated to punish Taseer 
for it. Mumtaz Qadri, one of Salman Taseer’s guards, was also offended by the comments. 
His anger was exacerbated after he visited mosques where the imams gave fiery sermons 
against Taseer and demand that he be killed. On January 4th, 2011, as Taseer came out of a 
                                                          
2 First Information Report: an investigative report lodged at the police station to request criminal proceedings 
3 The first and lowest of the 3-tier Judicial system of Pakistan. The next in hierarchy is the High court followed 
by the Supreme court. 
4 The largest province of Pakistan. Aasia Bibi’s village ‘Ittan Wali’ is part of Punjab. 
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restaurant in a posh locality of Islamabad5, Qadri fired at him. Taseer died instantly. Qadri 
offered himself for arrest declaring that he had done the right thing. He was awarded a death 
sentence on 14 February, 2011 by an Anti-terrorist court6. He appealed against the judgement 
in High court and then later in the Supreme court. After exhausting all his appeals, Qadri 
sought a presidential pardon which was also declined. After a 5-year long trial, Qadri was 
executed on 29th February, 2016. 
The saga of Aasia Bibi, Salman Taseer and Mumtaz Qadri is especially important to 
understand the societal discourse surrounding the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. None of the 
other ‘blasphemy’ cases garnered such interests from local or international press. Human 
Rights’ groups were especially active in the case of Aasia Bibi. Pope Benedict XVI called for 
Aasia’s release and later Pope Fracis met her family and blessed them, reiterating the plea. 
Salman Taseer’s involvement too was a first amongst politicians. No politician before Taseer 
had actively gotten involved in efforts to amend the Laws to the degree that he did. 
Conversations on the Laws were usually hushed and avoided in public places. Taseer, on the 
other hand, appeared on numerous TV shows and criticized them publicly. His murder too 
brought a different angle to the discourse. Taseer was not killed by a terrorist organization 
(although many hoped for it), he was instead killed by his own bodyguard. Taseer’s murder 
was proof how deeply indoctrinated the feelings for Blasphemy Laws are, making debates on 
them even more dangerous. And yet, with killing Taseer, Qadri forced the populace to 
question if religious outbursts could justify anarchy. His trials too were especially interesting 
because a sizeable proportion of the judicial system (lawyers and judges) believed that his 
actions were legally justified. On his first appearance in the court, Qadri was showered with 
rose petals by throngs of lawyers who came to support him. Similarly, an ex-chief justice of 
the second highest court of the country volunteered and spearheaded the his defense. All 
these events brought a legal angle to the discourse which was discussed by numerous lawyers 
and legal experts across different forms of media. 
Finally, the funerals of both Taseer and Qadri displayed the discord amongst the 
society on the issue of blasphemy. Taseer’s state funeral was turbulent as the designated 
Imams refused to lead the prayers of his funeral. Many politicians avoided attending his 
funeral and paying him his last respects. On the other hand, after Qadri was executed, the 
state ordered a media blackout on his funeral proceedings. Still, an estimated crowd of a 
                                                          
5 Capital of Pakistan 
6 Please see chapter 3 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
4 
 
100,0007 attended his funeral, amongst them leaders and representatives of some of the 
biggest political parties of Pakistan. Since then, although Taseer has become a mere footnote 
in the story of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws, Qadri has been lionized and continues to attract 
an overwhelming support from political leaders and common populace alike. His burial place 
has been made into a mausoleum with devotees travelling across the country to pay their 
respects to him. Pakistani media offered various interpretations of this discord, further 
encrusting the already dense discourse around the Blasphemy Laws. 
This study sought to penetrate this discourse and analyze the different layers of 
societal constructs used to argue either side of the conversation. For the study, column pieces 
from the leading newspapers were collected throughout the time from Taseer’s first visit to 
Aasia Bibi till the execution of Qadri. The narratives were then broken down into categories 
of authorities for argumentation using the grounded theory approach. Finally, imageries and 
objects of epistemic work were identified and contextualized in line with the different 
readership of the two newspapers. While at it, the different world cultures at play were also 
identified, questioning the country’s insistence on its uniqueness and obsession towards 
“banal nationalism.” 
The study is structured in the following manner. Chapter 1 is the introduction. 
Chapter 2 offers the overall research idea of the study in the form of four key questions. 
Chapter 3 deals with the historical background of Pakistan and the country’s link with its 
colonial past. This is followed by a historical background of the Blasphemy Laws and an 
overview of its applications. A descriptive narrative of the events that led to the execution of 
Qadri finishes the chapter. In Chapter 4, the theoretical framework of different theories 
applicable on the study is presented. Chapter 5 deals with the Data and Methodology of the 
study and describes the data collection process. Chapter 6 is a description of data structured 
into the categories represented in the narratives. Chapter 7 is the analysis where the findings 
are analyzed and further findings shared. Chapter 8 is the conclusion and Chapter 9 includes 
all the references. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Please see: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/01/funeral-pakistani-mumtaz-qadri-executed-
salmaan-taseer 
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Chapter 2: Research questions 
The thesis is an attempt to recognize the discourse surrounding the Blasphemy Laws 
in Pakistan. This is done by analyzing columns published in the leading newspapers of the 
country, Dawn and Daily Jang. The former is an English newspaper and caters to the elite 
class of well educated, mostly liberal readership. The latter, an Urdu publication, is the polar-
opposite for its readership mostly encompasses the less-educated masses of the country. The 
thesis is driven by the following research questions: 
 
 What is the rhetorical and discursive work done to rationalize or oppose the 
Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan in their current form? 
o What are the imageries and objects of epistemic work engaged in the discourse 
surrounding the Blasphemy Laws? How are they used to bring the arguments 
forward? 
o Given the difference in readership, what are the variations between the choices 
of imageries and objects of epistemic work between the columns of Dawn and 
Daily Jang? 
 What different world cultures effect Pakistan as it seeks to establish a stand on the 
Blasphemy Laws that contradict its international commitments? 
 
Chapter 3: Historical Background 
Chapter 3.1: History of Pakistan: The paradox of identity 
Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan, aptly described the country as a 
‘laboratory’ for fusion of Islam with politics (Jalal 2014, p.56). Almost 70 years since its 
birth, the country continues to flirt with such experimentation, arguably growing more 
religious with time. Some contest that it was never meant to be a religious state. ‘You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the business of the 
State’8, the country’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah announced in his first presidential 
address to the constituent assembly. There were many amongst his cabinet who disagreed 
with the founder’s secular vision. The establishment tried to block the speech in mainstream 
media (Noorani 2012). Today the eloquent speech is a mere footnote in the history of the 
country.  
                                                          
8 Muhammad Ali Jinnah”s first Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (August 11, 1947) 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html 
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This disagreement was far from surprising. The idea of Pakistan was rooted in the 
identity crisis faced by the Muslims of the subcontinent during the British rule. Previously, 
rulers of the subcontinent and now colonial subjects, the populace continued to carry the 
regret of their downfall. Their insecurity worsened after the decennial census of 1872. Now 
quantified, Muslim leaders started “publicly” acknowledging the worrisome reality of them 
being a “permanent minority in a pre-dominantly Hindu India” (Ispahani 2017, p12). In 1906, 
a Muslim delegation under Sir Agha Khan visited British Viceroy Minto and demanded 
separate electorates for the Muslim population. The demands were met in the Indian Councils 
Act 1909. Seeing the success, the delegation formalized into ‘Muslim League’, a party 
dedicated to fight for Muslim rights in the Indian subcontinent. Thus started the identity-
based political struggle that would lead to the formation of Pakistan. 
Of the many important personalities in the movement for Pakistan’s freedom, none 
matches up to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. A Britain educated lawyer, Jinnah joined the League in 
1913 and eventually became its president. He had earlier resigned from India’s largest native 
political party, the Congress, because it’s president, Mahatma Gandhi, decided to support the 
Khilafat movement9. Jinnah was strictly against the infusion of religion and politics and his 
priority for the same “remained constant throughout his career” (Jalal 1994, p.8). The 
League, under his leadership, pressured the ruling British government for increased 
recognition of Muslim population in politics, eventually translating into a demand for a 
separate nation. Conservative Muslim leaders such as Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the 
religious right party Jamaat-e-Islami10, campaigned against Muslim League and disregarded 
the aspirations for a separate nation (Ali 2002, p.170). However, once formed, the same 
parties took active role in shaping the identity of Pakistan. 
Jinnah passed away just a year after Pakistan’s independence from British colonial 
rule and separation from India in August 1947. His struggle and career earned him a 
foundational role in the birth and existence of Pakistan. He ‘championed’ the movement for a 
separate nation and ‘carved’ it from the Hindu-majority subcontinent (Singh 2009, p.15). 
Today, he is widely recognized as the administrative and constitutional father of the nation 
and is the foremost representative of nationalism for the country. However, the ‘true’ Jinnah 
                                                          
9 The Khilafat movement was a campaign in India to pressurize the British to not to abolish the Ottoman 
Caliphate post WW1. By supporting the mainly religious movement, Gandhi sought to win over Muslims. The 
movement eventually became violent when 22 policemen were killed by agitated protestors and Gandhi called 
off support. 
10 Jamaat-e-Islami is the biggest Islamic party of Pakistan and has been part of numerous joint-government 
arrangements both federally and provincially.   
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
7 
 
remains a mystery as there exist different versions of the founder with respect to different 
political and religious ideologies (Ahmed 1997, p.33).  
Another central figure in the struggle for Pakistan is Muhammad Iqbal, commonly 
referred to as Allama Iqbal. An early figure in the Muslim League, he ‘holds a special place 
as the visionary of Pakistan, (as) its spiritual founder’ (Khan 2012, p. 58). In his capacity as 
the president of Muslim League, Iqbal gave a speech in 1930 which permanently cemented a 
central role for him in the movement for Pakistan. In this speech (later given the title of 
“Allahabad11 address”), Iqbal stated that Muslim population of the subcontinent required a 
separate territory to preserve Islam. This claim earned him the title of ‘the father of the 
Pakistan idea’ (Aziz 1967, p. 54). From then on, the independence movement thrived on the 
idea offered by Iqbal. His support for Muslim nationalism, and hence the future Pakistan, 
provided ‘intellectual credibility’ to the independence movement (Devji 2013, p. 110). Thus, 
it is no understatement to call Iqbal the philosophical, cultural and ideological father of 
Pakistan. He died in 1938 while the Muslims were still struggling for his vision. 
Jinnah’s death in 1948, a year after independence, left a vacuum of leadership and 
gave politicians the opportunity to shape the narrative of the country from scratch, imbedding 
religion into it (Waterman 2014). Since the movement for its formation was based on a 
distinct Muslim identity, the nationalist and religious narrative easily meshed into each other, 
becoming an essential tool for politicians to win votes (Wynbrandt 2009). On March 7, 1949, 
Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, introduced the Objectives Resolution; 
a preamble to the planned constitution of the country (Newberg 1995). The resolution 
strongly supported the formation of the country’s political framework on the principles and 
values of Islam (Bindra 1990, p.81). The nod in this direction gave the religious lobby 
reasons to form pressure groups to keep a check on the government’s commitment to Islam. 
These groups grew more powerful as the state, due to sheer incompetency, failed to ensure 
social ethics in the country (Jalal 2014, p.57). First, in 1949, a militant Sunni organization 
‘Ahrar’ demanded the state to officially declare the Ahmadis as heretics (Qadir 2015). The 
Ahmadis, who consider themselves devout Muslims, were persecuted by other Muslims since 
the foundation of their sect in the late 19th century British Indian Punjab. This was largely due 
to the claims of their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, of being a reformer, leader and 
                                                          
11 Allahabad is a city in Utter Pradesh, India. 
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‘prophet’ of Islam12. In addition to theological differences, Ahmadis were often accused of 
colluding with British and sympathizing in the favor of the Hindu population during colonial 
rule. These accusations carried through after Pakistan was established and the community 
moved its headquarters from India to the city of Lahore in Pakistan.  
In 1953, many religious parties grouped under an umbrella organization, the Tehrik-e-
Tahaffuz-e-Khatme-Nabbuwat (Movement for the Protection of the Finality of the Prophet) 
and demanded the official ostracizing of Ahmadis from the Muslim community. The 
agitation eventually became violent translating into an organized pogrom of some 2000 
Ahmadis by rioting mobs (Ispahani 2017, p.46). These movements grounded the roots for 
ideological interpretations of the Blasphemy Laws of the country. Formation of the 1973 
constitution of Pakistan reignited the anti-Ahmadi movement in the country. The religious 
lobby, infuriated that Ahmadis held important positions in government infrastructure, wanted 
these positions for themselves. To win endorsement for the constitution from the religious 
lobby, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulifqar Ali Bhutto13, included the declaration of 
finality of prophethood in the oath of the President and Prime Minister (Taseer 1980). 
Moreover, there was international pressure on Pakistan for the same. King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia, to counteract the increasing influence of the Shah of Iran in the region, pledged 
generous Saudi aid to Pakistan contingent on it accepting their Wahhabist version of Islam. 
Declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims was also included in this demand.  
Two months later, in April 1974, the Rabita al- Alam- al- Islami (Islamic World 
Congress) meeting held in Mecca demanded all Muslim governments to declare Ahmadis as 
non-Muslims, effectively barring them from holding official positions (Jalal 2014, p.205). In 
Pakistan, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi’s Jaaat-e-Islami started a fresh wave of anti-Ahmadi 
riots. Maududi traditionally had close connections with the Saudis due to which the party 
enjoyed exuberant amounts of funding, which ensured the momentum of the movement. 
After a small clash between the students of a medical college and some Ahmadis in 
                                                          
12 Albeit he clarified that he used the title differently. He insisted that Muhammad was the last of law-bearing 
prophets (the law being the God-given text of Quran). He, on the other hand, was solely a reformist prophet 
working on the same laws and text that Muhammad brought. 
13 Zulifqar Ali Bhutto was the prime minister of Pakistan from 1973-1977. Hugely popular, he came to power as 
a ‘left-oriented’, self-proclaimed ‘socialist’, leader. During his tenure, he started experimenting with Islam and 
tried to introduce Islamic Socialism within the society. It was under his rule that the 2nd amendment to the 
constitution of Pakistan was passed, which declared Ahmadis as heretics. Unlike his apparent persona, he also 
tried to Islamise the society for political victory over opponents. For a detailed analysis on his experimentation, 
please see Qadir (2015) 
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Rabwah14, the sect’s home town, violence spread across Punjab and NWFP (now Khyber-
Pukhtunkhwa). Ahmadiyya community members were knifed, their properties and mosques 
burnt and graves desecrated. The riots resulted in 42 deaths, 27 of whom were Ahmadis 
(Kennedy 1989). 
             Some two months later, in June 13, 1974, Bhutto announced to discuss the Ahmadi 
issue in the country’s parliament. From August 5 to September 7, in-camera proceedings 
were held.  Those proceedings concluded in a unanimous recommendation for a 
constitutional amendment to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This became the second 
amendment of the Constitution of Pakistan whereby the Ahmadiyya community was to be 
treated as a non-Muslim minority.  A decade later, President Zia-ul- Haq issued the ‘Anti-
Islamic Activities of Qadiyani Group, Lahori group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and 
Punishment) Ordinance’ that declared most of their social and personal activities as criminal 
offences (Qadir 2015).  As per the additions to the penal code, most aspects of Ahmadi 
religious life were made illegal, leading to continued prosecution of the community (Hussain 
2015). These formed a portion of the Blasphemy Laws of the country (see below). 
Chapter 3.2: History of the Blasphemy Laws 
Chapter 3.2.1: The British heritage. As it is with all laws, there is a historical 
context to the emergence, impositions and eventual amendments of the Blasphemy Laws of 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s first constitutional instruments were the Government of India Act 1935 
and the Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Hassan 2006). Its legal system of today is rooted 
in the laws implemented in British India, which were themselves derived from English 
Common Law (Lau 1994). On independence, Pakistan adopted a revised version of the 
Indian Penal Code and renamed it as the “Pakistan Penal Code” (Saeed 2013). A watered-
down version of the Blasphemy Laws were already part of the Indian Penal Code and the new 
country adopted it. The history of this ‘watered down’ version offers insight into their 
evolution into their current form. The original ‘blasphemy law’ became part of the Indian 
Penal Code in 1860, three years after the Indian mutiny, which was instigated due to religious 
insensitivity. The British forces required the Indian army to use gun cartridges that had to be 
chewed before they could be used. It was later discovered that the cartridges were laced with 
cow and pig fat. Cows held religious significance in Hinduism whereas pigs were haram 
(forbidden) in Islam. The Indian army mutinied. The British authorities were eventually able 
                                                          
14 Official name: Chenab Nagar. The only city in Pakistan with a predominant majority of the Ahmadi sect. The 
city is the official headquarters of the Ahmaddiya Movement in Pakistan.  
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to curb the mutiny and offered reforms in policies to avoid future repetitions of likely 
circumstances. The ‘blasphemy law’ was part of these reforms. Back then, the Law was 
introduced to ensure stability in a multi-religious society and stated that everyone had the 
right to practice a religion of their choice. Moreover, no one could insult religions regardless 
of creed or religious affiliations. The Law was not altered until 1929 when the clause of 
‘Offences relating to Religion’ was added as 295-A. This came about after the (in)famous 
case of Ilm-u-din who murdered the publisher of a book that ridiculed Mohammad. When the 
‘blasphemous’ book was published, there were protests by the Muslim community 
demanding the ban of the book and the persecution of the publisher who refused to reveal the 
name of the writer. The publisher, Rajpal, was taken to the court where he was convicted of 
offending religious sentiments. However, Rajpal appealed against his sentence in High court 
and was eventually acquitted as the judge ruled that there was no law in the state that 
punished such insults. Ilm-ud-din, exasperated by the failure of the judicial system, decided 
to take the matter in his own hands. He went to Rajpal’s shop and killed him. He was 
arrested, found guilty of murder and hanged in 1929. After his death, the 295-A amendment 
was added to the law to state: Whoever with deliberate or malicious intentions of outraging 
the religious feelings of any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words either spoken or 
written, by visible representations insults or attempts to insult religion or religious beliefs of 
that class shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for 2 years or fine or 
both.  
Ilm-u-din is still revered today as a hero in Pakistan. As will be seen later in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7, the incident of Ilm-ud-din is used to justify the actions of Qadri claiming that 
in his case as well, the state was incompetent to impart justice. 
Chapter 3.2.2: Evolution of the Laws. When adopting the ‘blasphemy law’ as part 
of the Pakistan Penal Code, the state increased the sentence for blasphemy to 10 years. As 
detailed above, the Ahmadiyya sect were declared non-Muslim in 1974 during the 
government of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. In 1982, during the tenure of the Islamist military 
dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, the Blasphemy Laws were further amended to become far more 
reaching and strict, a form that still exists in the society today. Zia had overthrown Prime 
Minister Bhutto in a military coup in 1977; Bhutto was later tried by a military court and 
hanged. In order to rationalize his unconstitutional rule, Zia sought the favor of the Islamist 
parties by introducing Sharia Law in the form of Hadood (limits) ordinance. These 
ordinances made alterations in the Pakistan Penal Code and introduced Islamic Punishments. 
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It was during Zia’s tenure that a Majlis-e-Shura (an Islamic parliament) and a Federal Shariat 
Court were constructed comprising unelected, handpicked orthodox individuals, who were 
given the power to make amendments to the constitution and laws. Moreover, the Evidence 
Act of 1872 was replaced by “Qanune Shahadat (the law of claiming) Presidential Order XX 
of 1984” whereby the provisions were to be read and judged in light of the Quran and Sunnah 
and the credibility of the witnesses was based on observing Islamic injunctions (Shakir 2015). 
With this infrastructure set, a number of amendments were made to the Blasphemy Laws. In 
1982, a new law was passed that included punishment for desecrating of the Quran. Act III of 
1986 was also included after much religious lobbying which extended the section to also 
include insult to the Prophet Muhammad. These acts came under article 295-B of the 
constitution which increased the 10-year punishment to life imprisonment. A later article, 
295-C was added to make the punishment as life imprisonment or death. Later, in 1991, a 
petition was brought to the Federal Shariat Court where the possibility of life imprisonment 
was challenged. The court ruled that the possibility of any other punishment besides death 
was ‘repugnant’15 and hence the sole punishment of capital punishment was set in law for all 
blasphemy convicts. Nearly 3 decades later, the same Laws and punishments prevail in the 
country. No government in the subsequent tenures was able to put the draconian laws to 
debate due to intimidation by the religious lobby and the sensitivity of the issue.  
Chapter 3.2.3: An overview of the Laws and their misuse. There is no denying the 
fact that the Blasphemy Laws have “had disastrous effects on the entire Pakistani society” 
(Shakir 2015). The Laws are widely acknowledged to be misused for ulterior motives. In 
addition, they sharply contradict “human rights guaranteed by the constitution of Pakistan 
and international treaties” (Julius 2016). The amendments, which are insisted by their 
proponents to protect the minorities and to stop misuse, have in fact made the society more 
intolerant. Also, the accusations are not limited to minorities or socially deprived individuals. 
In fact, individuals bearing a liberal mindset (such as Junaid Hafeez, a Fulbright scholar 
languishing in jail since 2013 for voicing liberal thoughts), slanting towards a Sufi 
interpretation of Islam (Shemeem Burney Abbas and Amjad Sabri), or for being an Ahmadi 
and practicing one’s religion, are all accused under the Blasphemy Laws. During British Rule 
till independence in 1947, there were a total of 7 cases filed on the original version of the 
laws (Shakir 2015). Post-partition and before the amendments in the 80s, 8 cases of 
                                                          
15 The Court order found in Sr. No 336 in: 
http://federalshariatcourt.gov.pk/Leading%20Judgements/decided%20shariat%20cases.doc 
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blasphemy were reported. Since the amendments in 1987 to 2016, 1335 cases have been 
reported (Amnesty International, 2016). 51 accused have been killed extra judicially, some of 
them after being acquitted by the courts, some while still in police custody (Julius 2016, 
Supreme Court of Pakistan 2015, p.26). The mob justice has not been limited to the accused 
alone, for throngs of emotional Muslims have often used claims of blasphemy to burn down 
entire Christian villages. Such is the insistence of death sentence for blasphemy accused that 
Maulana Yousaf Qureshi, the cleric of Mohabat Khan Mosque in Peshawar, on a potential 
presidential pardon for Aasia Bibi declared: “We expect her to be hanged and if she is not 
hanged then we will ask the Taliban to kill her.” More recently, just before the final appeal of 
Aasia Bibi in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the clerics of an infamous Islamabad mosque, 
who are known to have ties with Al-Qaeda and Taliban, warned the courts against any 
leniency towards Aasia Bibi. The reliance of and connections to international terrorist 
organization for “blasphemy” cases reveals the larger problem with religiously motivated 
laws in general. These laws hence don’t solely reflect a local narrow-mindedness but, in fact, 
have also become part of the international security and global terrorism narrative as tools for 
militant ideology (Abbas, S.B. 2013). 
Chapter 3.2.4: The case of Aasia Bibi. In 2010, for the first time since the inclusion 
of the Laws, there was political activity towards reforming them. Salman Taseer, the 
governor of the biggest province of the country, Punjab, lobbied for a revision of the Laws 
after meeting Aasia Bibi, the first woman to be sentenced to death for committing blasphemy 
in the history of Pakistan. Taseer also announced that he would seek presidential pardon for 
the accused as her punishment was very ‘strict’ and ‘cruel’.16 He also insisted that the 
Blasphemy Laws were being used to target and harass minorities. His call was supported by 
the Federal Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti. However, there was widespread reaction 
to the press conference. Religious parties took to the streets to protest his claims. By 
criticizing the Laws and claiming them to be man-made, these parties claimed, Taseer had 
committed blasphemy as well. Certain leaders appealed to the Chief Justice of Pakistan, to 
take suo moto (self-initiated) action against Governor Taseer for supporting Aasia Bibi. There 
was an obvious discontent between his own party. The country’s Law Minister, who 
                                                          
16 Direct translation from the press conference. Original words were “Sakht” and “Zaalim”. 
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belonged to the same political party as Taseer, the Pakistan People’s Party17, exclaimed that 
“in my presence as the Law Minister, no one should think of finishing this law(s).”18  
In a matter of weeks, on January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer was assassinated by his own guard 
as he came out of a restaurant in a posh locality of Islamabad. 2 months later, on March 2, 
2011, Shabaz Bhatti was killed by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan for his support for the 
amendments of the Blasphemy Law. The murderer of the Governor, Mumtaz Qadri, insisted 
that his actions were in line with Quran. His first trial was held in an “Anti-terrorism court” 
(ATC) where he was sentenced to death. These courts were especially developed by the 
country’s polity to give swift decisions on cases pertaining to terrorism. The decisions passed 
could be appealed against in the high courts of the country. Qadri’s council did just that in 
October 2011. On 9th March 2015, the Islamabad High court maintained the death sentence 
on Qadri while accepting his application that his actions did not fall under the purview of 
terrorism. Qadri’s council, encouraged at this development, appealed against the High court’s 
decision to the highest court of the country, the Supreme Court. The appeal was lodged on 
April 2015 and the appellants sought the annulment of his death penalty. In its landmark 
decision in October 2015, the Supreme Court bench not only maintained Qadri’s death 
penalty but also, disagreeing with the Islamabad High court’s decision, re-included the 
terrorism charge on him. His council filed for a review petition which was dismissed by the 
court in December 2015. After the courts maintained his death penalty, Qadri’s council 
sought a presidential pardon which was declined as well. Throughout his trial, besides 
support from religious and political parties, Qadri was supported by a significant portion of 
the legal community. On his first appearance in court, he was greeted by a hundreds of 
lawyers who pledged their support for him and showered roses on him19. A former chief 
justice of a high court voluntarily defended his case. In Qadri’s court appearances, his legal 
team outnumbered the police presence in the courts.20 After a long and dangerous judicial 
process lasting over five years, Mumtaz Qadri was hanged on 29th February 2016.  
As of the latest, Aasia Bibi’s last appeal against the death sentence in the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan, which was scheduled for 13 October 2016, has been adjourned till an 
                                                          
17 Pakistan People’s Party was founded by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto, the originator of the 2nd amendment (please see 
above). However, as described, he was a leftist leader and his party followed the stance after his death. Today 
the party continues to follow the same ideology and comparatively more progressive than its counterparts.  
18 Interview: https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/610178-babar-awan-says-no-one-can-change-
blasphemy-law 
19 Lawyers shower roses for governor's killer: https://www.dawn.com/news/596300 
20 Mumtaz Qadri’s legal team outnumbers police presence at IHC: https://www.dawn.com/news/1159926 
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unforeseen date. These events form the spine of this thesis. A representation and analysis 
across these different events will follow in chapter 6 and 7. 
 
Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
Chapter 4.1: World Culture 
The world of today is unique in its form. It’s compressed and interdependent 
(Robertson 2008, 49) and isomorphic (Thomas 2009). The term global village has become 
more than a cliché: it’s become an explanation of the life being lived today by actors spread 
all across the world. Even in the remotest of regions, the influence of globalization can be 
observed and felt. The supra-territorial relations (Scholte 2005), economic dependence 
(Pieterse 2013) and social interactions (Held and Mcgrew 2000, pg.3) further the process of 
globalization. In this interconnected environment, global policies are pursued and adopted out 
of sheer fashion (Alasuutari, P. et al, 2014).  
Many theories try to explain this homogenization. Historically linked to John W. 
Meyer (Schofer et al. 2012, 57), neo-institutionalism explains these similarities in terms of 
“world culture” accepted inherently by a world society. Described by Thomas (2009), “world 
culture” explores the idea of global cultural forces dictating trends that transcend borders and 
appeal to the world society. Boli and Thomas (1997) rightly recognize world culture as a lens 
through which we can understand the world we live in. The norms and trends adopted by all 
actors come about due to the environment allowed by the cultural setting of the world. The 
naturalization of trends is a result of shared beliefs and perceptions prevalent across the world 
(Meyer et al. 1997), making them the “obvious” choice. These trends are adopted rationally 
by actors due to self-engineered decision makings. Nations all over the world indulge in such 
“rationalism,” adopting a world cultural script inherently (Meyer & Bromley 2013). In this 
setting hence, each player individually rationalizes to come to the same decision as others. 
The countries firmly believe that the chosen decisions best serve their interests. Hence they 
do not need any coercion, manipulation or dictation for it.  
The signing of human rights conventions by numerous countries worldwide is one 
such example of world culture. Countries have come to believe that the conventions are 
gateways via which they can show themselves as what Meyer et al. (1997) calls “proper” 
states. Being “proper,” as a preference, is inherently built on seeing “privileges” that come 
with being developed. So, the countries base their decision on this imagery of the world and 
sign onto conventions, even those that they hardly believe in or plan to pursue. The belief is a 
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representation of world culture. Signing onto these conventions are a world cultural norm 
exercised by most of the countries across the world even though there is no political or 
regional pressure on them to do so. Taking example from the thesis, on being founded, 
Pakistan was not forced by any country to first make the Pakistan Penal Code and then later 
dedicate its bureaucratic and political machinery to form a constitution. And yet, it was the 
first thing it did. This was due to its belief that having a constitution was the requirement of 
being recognized as a state. In reality, no such guidelines to nation-building exist. Pakistan 
was simply adhering to a world-cultural norm by becoming exactly like any other country on 
the globe.  
Chapter 4.1.1: Cultural scripts. Trends that diffuse across nations and become inherent 
choices are examples of actors enacting global models and cultural scripts (Alasuutari 2014). 
These scripts are in line with the layers of world culture the states are embedded into. Nation 
states firmly take themselves as representation of being sovereign and autonomous actors. 
However, the actions they undertake at global or local level tend to reflect the expectations of 
global cultural scripts they adhere to (Meyer et al, 1997). Hence the cultural scripts can be 
seen as the contexts that guide the nations to reach their decisions. The cultural scripts do not 
solely exist at nation state level. In fact, every actor is deeply ingrained in this practice of 
embracing and acting on world-culture scripts. For example, students in universities all over 
the world, single mindedly pursue their degrees for better professional opportunities. In this 
pursuit, many students spend much time and energy mastering skills that have no use in their 
professional lives but they are ‘expected’ to know. Although hardly anyone reaches a point in 
their lives where these expectations materialize and the said skill is made use of, but the 
students continue to enact and believe these supposed expectations generations after 
generations. 
Chapter 4.2: Epistemic governance 
 The world today is isomorphic to a greater degree than it was ever before (Thomas, 
2009). Isomorphism is defined as: “a world whose societies, organized as nation states, are 
structurally similar in many unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly similar 
ways” (Meyer et al., 1997). In this environment, national polices debated and applied on a 
local level seem to be incredibly similar to international trends. Interestingly, political actors 
are seen to embrace these trends wholeheartedly by justifying them as the rational choice 
(Dobbin et al., 2007) and as something that’s good for them (Alasuutari, 2011). Once 
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convinced, these actors pitch a narrative that derives out of the widely accepted social reality. 
Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) see this as an example of epistemic governance. 
The Cambridge dictionary describes the term “epistemic” as an adjective related to 
knowledge or studying of knowledge. In that sense, epistemic governance would imply 
governing based on imposing or presenting of knowledge. In their paper, Alasuutari and 
Qadir (2014) build upon this definition in terms of the technique policy makers use to 
convince their audience and push forward policy changes. The policy makers rely on the 
conceptions of the audience about the society, which they are part of, to govern them 
epistemically. It is important to note here that the policy makers do not indulge in a 
“conspiracy” and manipulate the audience after recognizing their “weaknesses.” On the 
contrary, epistemic governance is a natural, mostly un-motivated technique of forming 
narratives. Consciously or otherwise, all of us indulge in epistemic governance when trying 
to convince someone else of something. These widely recognized understandings which form 
the background for epistemic work are based on (self-evident) mental imageries of the 
society (Alasuutari & Qadir, 2016). The imageries include: perceiving a modus operandi to 
social evolution/ modernization/ development, seeing the society as hierarchically organized, 
and distributed into competing blocs. Hence, the actor must work along the well-established 
imageries to make their audience believe in them. In the first case, they can insist on a 
particular policy being essential for development. Similarly, they can emphasize the natural 
belief of a hierarchical society and use the layers to validate their points. Lastly, they can rely 
on the belief of competitiveness, terming their view important for an eventual victory. This 
epistemic work can be both conscious and unconscious. However, not all imageries need to 
necessarily exist in all the discourses. Actors can also employ just one or two imageries.  
The imageries form the basis for arguments and narratives. The perceived reality is 
only as real as the imageries the actors believe in. The imageries contextualize steps and 
actions and form the basis of thought process related to opinionating about matters. In that 
sense, the actors conceptualize how the situation looks like to their audience and develop 
ways to act on these conceptions. As an example, an analysis of the actions of a lone terrorist 
through epistemic governance can highlight the merits of this approach. Most of the lone 
terrorist tragedies are subject to beliefs that are often brushed aside by labeling the terrorist 
“delusional” or “indoctrinated.” The terrorist of course does not box himself in these 
categories. Deep down, he firmly believes in these imageries so much so that he is ready to 
give away his life or to harm others for them. The imageries contextualize his version of 
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reality and helps him understand how to look at situations. The imageries also help him gauge 
the options available to him to act or respond. In this case the terrorist might, for example, see 
his environment clashing with his traditional values. He could also recognize that the society 
is hierarchical and he is very low in that order to make any change. Moreover, the society that 
is modernizing around him is puncturing his traditional values and dogmas. All these 
imageries might frustrate him. His actions now will be based on the contextualizing  of these 
imageries that he believes in. The example will be continued after explaining the of epistemic 
work. 
The actors engaging the imageries of their audience focus on three objects of 
epistemic work: the ontology of the environment, the understanding of the actors and 
identifications, and generally accepted values and norms. These objects are essential in 
forming one’s view of the reality. The ontology of the environment refers to presenting the 
situation at hand using authoritative knowledge. By using facts and research, an actor shows 
that he better recognizes what the “reality” is. The said presentation can be real or 
exaggerated and can influence another’s perception of reality hence making them more 
agreeable.  
Similarly, the actor can further generate a consensus on a decision or action by 
associating it to the true or forced identification of the audience. Thus, epistemic work can 
involve emphasizing identifications; creating a community with shared interests.  These 
identifications can be based on what people understand of themselves, on who they think they 
are and what community they think they belong to.  
Lastly, the actor must convince others that a particular action is in accordance with 
shared norms, ideals and mores. These norms are an essential part of any society and are 
deeply ingrained in the mindset of the individuals. In some ways, he too defines the 
individual’s perceptions, beliefs, principles and preferences. By linking an action to widely 
shared values, the actor manages to undertake an incredibly effective approach towards 
establishing epistemic dominance. 
Yet again, the understanding of the role, the norms and the ontological reliance is 
taken for granted. Actors manage to believe in imageries depending on how they identify 
themselves. These identifications are themselves based on the ontological stock the actor has. 
Once the actor manages to identify himself in line with perceived imageries, the way forward 
is a result of a cultural script embedded into the actor’s psyche. He is supposed to act in a 
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particular way; think in a particular manner. Of course, these norms and values are not forced 
upon the actor but are sought by themselves as the ‘normal’ and natural next step.  
Going back to our example of the lone terrorist who believes in certain imageries, he 
now must act on them. Before he acts, he will understand the situation based on facts. He will 
appeal to information banks that can further cement his understanding of the imageries. In 
this case, instead of looking at databanks that are conventionally accepted, he would instead 
rely on data made available through terrorist propaganda to confirm his understanding. 
Similarly, he would dig deeper into these outlets to understand the ontology of the 
environment. Based on this understanding, he would then associate himself to a particular 
identification. Of course, this association will come naturally and automatically to him. the 
terrorist might find himself as an agent of change; the one who will turn the tables and correct 
what is wrong. As this agent of change has gauged the situation based on the imageries and 
the ontology, he will now proceed with the “norm” by acting as dictated by the fabric of his 
perceived realities. In such cases, the norm is usually the challenging of the prevalent system; 
harming it. Ergo, the terrorist will move forward and terrorize the system in an attempt to 
shape it in accordance with his version of the reality.  
Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) insist that for epistemic governance to take place 
effectively, an actor must work on all 3 of the above-stated epistemic objects. The thesis will 
look into this claim by identifying a) the self-assumed imageries and b) the 3 epistemic 
objects in the narratives of the columns of the chosen papers.  
Chapter 4.3: Columns as reflection of society 
Media does not merely affect the society; it reflects it as well (Nawaz, 1983). In that 
sense, the content that is published, besides representing accepted views of the state, reflects 
the discourse within society. The editorial frames are true hallmarks of views and opinions of 
the target audience (Fair & Hamza, 2016). They imitate public discourse by highlighting 
prevalent opinions, values, ideologies and power structures (Shoeb, 2008). The editorial and 
columns sections of newspapers offer much insight into the prevalent societal opinions and 
editorial biases (Haque & Sheikh, 1994). While there have been extensive studies on framing 
by newspapers, most have largely focused only on the reporting manner and news stories 
(Eilders & Lüter, 2000). Although framing is similar to epistemic governance, it does not 
fully capture the essence of the approach. The adherents of the framing approach perceive 
that there is an active agency that seeks to choose frames for its audience. Hence, the 
audience are seen as passive partners of this arrangement. However, in epistemic governance, 
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the frames are not seen as “manipulated” but are natural lenses that are ingrained in the 
realities the active audience and the selecting columnists and editors believe in.  
Strategically placed across the editorial section, columns aim to attract new users 
while simultaneously improving the quality of debate in the society and informing its readers 
(Rosenfeld, 2000). The columns can be rightly seen as advocacy tools, as they are mostly 
written by the “elites” of their fields (Sommer & Maycroft, 2008). In that manner, the 
columns can also represent how these “elites” view the society. Connecting this to our 
understanding of epistemic governance, the columns are indeed the best representation of the 
‘realities’ the elite believe their readership adheres to. As the columns are published in 
national newspapers, they also have the potential to influence the agenda of other media 
outlets (Golan, 2006). The columns also give the newspapers opportunity to focus on long 
term issues instead of the daily grind (Haque & Sheikh, 1994). Yet again, they offer insight 
into how the columnist believe their readers engage in discourses. By not pursuing the daily 
grind alone, the columnists manage to highlight the issues that are either ignored or replaced 
by other engaging news items. In that sense, the columns can be seen as highlighting the 
discourse that the society is focused on rather than the influx of events and news presented in 
the headlines. 
 
Chapter 5: Data and Methodology 
Chapter 5.1: Critical Discourse Analysis  
The data has been analyzed via a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Van Dijk 
(1977), one of the pioneers of CDA, describes discourse as seeing a text in its context. 
Fairclough (1992) terms discourse as the practice via which world is constructed in its 
meaning. Hence, facts and statistics are given a degree of depth by associating conceived 
notions with them. In that sense, a discourse is directed to go beyond the words and look at 
how language influences reality. Discourse, in its form and content, provides the fabric on 
which a fact makes sense to a targeted audience.  
A discourse analysis would seek to explore the meaning, structure and function of the 
discourse (Smith, 1999). Taking a look at discourse critically, CDA manages to reveal the 
discursive sources of power while also pointing out how these sources are “maintained and 
transformed within the contexts of the society” (Van Dijk, 1988). Several power authorities 
and agencies makeup our social structure. CDA helps the analyst to interpret and reflect the 
social threads within the narrative in this structure (Luke, 1997), while also addressing social 
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problems (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). In that sense, CDA looks upon the many factors at 
play that seek to employ some form of dominance to either shape or be in line with the 
narrative of the audience (Jaynes, 2015). CDA manages to bring forth the meanings, both 
apparent and latent within the context. These can be explicitly mentioned in the text or can be 
in the form of implied meanings that would make sense to a specific audience or readership.  
The data for this study underwent a discourse analysis keeping the social and religious 
realities of the potential audience in context. As the analysis was to be based on the social 
discourse on the Blasphemy Laws of the country, much attention was paid on the language 
used by the columnists. However, the content of the opinion pieces was left independent to 
shape its own arguments, without any preconceived expectations from them. This 
independence subsequently helped the author to come up with categories and subcategories 
for coding of the data, in line with the grounded theory approach. Charmaz (2008) explains 
how employing grounded theory in coding practices helps in coming up with analytical 
categories which can then be refined to offer abstract, conceptual theories of studied 
empirical phenomenon. For the study, categories of authorities were discovered after a 
sample of the data was analyzed using the grounded theory. The apparent trends formed the 
following categories of authority: a) Religion/Religious Authorities, b) Historical accounts, c) 
Law and Legal, and d) International lens. The breakdown and the analysis for these 
categories can be found in more detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
Chapter 5.2: Media in Pakistan 
Print media plays an especially significant role in energy-deprived countries such as 
Pakistan and is considered more ‘credible and reliable’ (Iqbal, A. et al, 2013). Fair et al 
(2015) downplays the potential of internet access as a source of information for Pakistanis 
due to the shortage of electricity to charge or power equipment. Established in a more viable 
position to reach the masses, the print media in Pakistan besides being a mobilizing force for 
change, is also a source of information for other media outlets (Nadadur, 2007). As of 2003, 
there are 945 print-media publications (newspapers and magazines) in Pakistan’s media 
space, publishing in 11 languages (IMS, 2009). Of these publications, a substantial proportion 
publishes in Urdu and English. Although spoken by a minority, both are the official 
languages of the country25. Urdu, which is the national language, inherits many of its words 
from local and regional languages and is widely understood even if not as widely spoken. As 
                                                          
25 CIA Factbook available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html 
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part of the colonial baggage, Pakistan inherited English as an official language and continues 
to use it as such.  
The divide between the audience of the two languages is not a mere technicality but 
instead represents the larger ideological differences that divide the Pakistani society (Shoeb, 
2008). Urdu newspapers which constitute 75% of the sold newspapers26, are mainly 
‘conservative, folkloristic, religious and sensational’ (IMS, 2009; Bukhari, 2015). In contrast, 
English newspapers, by and large, are more liberal and professional (Qadir & Alasuutari, 
2013).  
The state of Pakistan, making use of a newspaper’s ability to present news items and 
filter information available to the masses, keeps a strong check on the content in the form of 
both direct and indirect measures. The civilian government, for example, exerts pressure 
indirectly via either dedicating or restraining extensive budgets for advertisements (Nadadur, 
2007). They also pressurize the newspaper media houses by altering economic sanctions such 
as restricting newspaper pulp quotas or duties (Akhtar, 2000). The military intelligence too 
keeps a keen eye at the content, especially on the Urdu newspapers as they are the most 
widely understood and distributed (Fair & Hamza, 2016). Ergo, the newspapers represent the 
opinions and views of powerbrokers of the country showcasing the reality they perceive the 
audience of the newspapers believes in.  
The column pages are equally interesting pieces of analysis in Pakistani newspapers. 
Fair et al (2015), describing the general trend in a society, pointing out that people tend to 
take intellectual shortcuts by relying on the opinions of “respected elites” and establishing 
their own positions on them. This is more common in low information societies such as 
Pakistan, where these “elites” can be anyone from a radio or television commentator, a 
columnist or simply anyone held in high esteem. Some of the media elites who contribute as 
columnists for the leading newspapers of the country are either hosts or frequent guests on 
leading talk shows (Fair & Hamza, 2016). Hence, they manage to indulge in what Lecheler et 
al (2015) call ‘repetitive framing’, predisposing their audiences to certain ideologies and 
realities.  
This research focuses on columns published in Dawn and Daily Jang newspapers of 
Pakistan. Dawn, an English newspaper, was launched in 1941 by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the 
founder of Pakistan (Long, 2009). The paper tends to pursue left of center policies (Fair & 
Hamza, 2016). As the IMS (2009) reports, English newspapers tend to have smaller 
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audiences as compared to their Urdu counterparts, however, they have greater leverage on 
opinion makers and the general upper strata of the society. Hence, it has an elitist leadership 
and is not read by the common people (Akhtar 2000, pg.xxviii). However, as it is the most 
circulated English newspaper with a circulation of 138,000 daily and 10 million online views 
per month27, it can be seen as a reflection of the views and opinions of the elite.  
As per INFOASAID Pakistan, three of every four newspapers bought in 2008 in 
Pakistan were published in Urdu28. The daily Daily Jang is the most widely circulated and 
read newspaper in Urdu, with a daily circulation of over 800,000 per day and readership 
estimates of over 7 million (Jawad, 2008). The newspaper has a moderate conservative 
leaning (IMS, 2009). Some of its leading columnists host talk shows or appear as analysts on 
GEO news, one of the most popular TV channel of Pakistan and a sister organization of the 
Daily Jang Group. Due to its wide circulation and readership, the Daily Jang can be seen to 
represent the views and opinions of majority of the population. 
Chapter 5.3: Data collection 
The study is based on opinion pieces published in Dawn and Daily Jang. The choice 
for each were natural given their readership. The columns were collected from the archive 
sections of the websites of the respective newspapers. While there were numerous opinion 
pieces published in the newspapers that dealt with the themes of religion, extremism, 
minority rights etc., an effort was made to streamline the collection so that it best represented 
the discourse around the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. Generic pieces on the spread of 
extremism were not included in the data as the spread of extremism during the timeline could 
not be solely correlated to the Laws. However, generic articles about minority rights were 
included in the data as the Laws directly affect minority rights. 
The following timeline was created for the Aasia-Taseer-Qadri saga detailed in 
Chapter 3: 
• Nov 20, 2010: Taseer visits Aasia Bibi and calls the Blasphemy Law as a 'black 
law' 
• Nov 23, 2010: Ahle-e-Sunat issues a Fatwa and declares Taseer as an apostate 
• Jan 4, 2011: Taseer is assassinated 
• Feb 14, 2011: ATC29 charges Qadri 
                                                          
27 INFOASAID: Pakistan Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide June 2012 
28 ibid 
29 Anti-terrorism court. Please see Chapter 3 
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• Oct, 2011: Qadri is sentenced to death 
• Oct, 2011: Qadri appeals against the sentence 
• March 9, 2015: IHC30 upholds death sentence 
• April 13, 2015: Qadri appeals to SC 
• Oct 7, 2015: SC maintains death penalty 
• Dec 14, 2015: SC dismisses review petition 
• Feb 22, 2016: Qadri appeal's for the presidential pardon 
• Feb 29, 2016: Qadri is hanged 
The initial plan was to do a word search on the archive section and download the 
columns that fit the query. However, neither newspaper had such option on their website. 
Ergo, a manual search was done based on the above timeline. All opinion pieces archived on 
the newspaper’s websites till 15 days after an event on the aforementioned timeline were read 
and those pertaining to the concerned events were downloaded. The rationale for 15 days was 
the fact that columns do not necessarily appear on the next day of an event. Hence, a 15-day 
margin was given to columnists for every event, giving them reasonable time for writing and 
publishing their opinions. While all the desired columns were available in the Dawn archive, 
there was a gap in March- April 2015 columns in the Daily Jang archive hence the columns 
for these two months were not included in the data set. The final quantum of column filtered 
and shortlisted from both the newspapers amounted to 143 columns; 60 from Dawn and 83 
from Daily Jang. However, some of the columns were exempted as they did not directly 
engage with the Blasphemy Laws. The final total count amounted to 128. For a further 
breakdown, according to timelines, please see Chapter 6. 
Observations in the text shaped the coding categories. There were no predefined 
categories. Rather, a close reading of 10% of the data (8 Urdu columns and 6 English 
columns) was done to identify patterns of discourse. Special emphasis was on the narratives 
that illustrated the working of epistemic governance in the column. These were then 
translated into questions, which formed the basis of the data sorting. Data was then sorted 
into codes that reflected these questions. Once these codes were deemed satisfactory, all the 
data was distributed into them in Microsoft Excel. In case some important data did not fit in 
the category, they were recorded separately for future reflection. The codes/categories were 
not, as has been showed, theory-driven. In fact, they were finalized in line with what the data 
reflected, as is the case generally with the grounded theory. 
                                                          
30 Islamabad High Court. Please see Chapter 3 
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The data was sorted and divided into four primary categories of authorities within 
which all the discourse could be captured31. These categories were: Religion/Religious 
authorities, Historical accounts, Law and Legal and International lens. ‘Religion/Religious 
authorities’ included all the passages that spoke about religion in general or religious 
authorities in specific. Similarly, ‘Historical accounts’ included narratives that spoke about 
history, be it religious, national or international. The ‘Law and Legal’ code included all the 
accounts where the columnist used legality as an authority to their arguments. This reference 
could be to judicial processes, rulings and decisions or to the constitution of Pakistan. Lastly, 
the ‘International lens’ included narratives where the columnists either quoted international 
expectation, trends, conflicts or comparisons. Chapter 6 will describe how the data can be 
looked at through these categories.  
The Urdu data was translated into English by the author and to avoid any loss in 
translation, the Urdu to English dictionary ‘Kitabistan’s New Millennium Composite 
Dictionary: New Millennium edition’ was used where required. The data was controlled for 
and checked against the following: the language (and hence representing different 
demographics of readers) and events within the aforementioned Aasia-Taseer-Qadri timeline. 
The process of scrutiny, filter and coding adopted by the author falls in line with discourse 
analysis used by Alasuutari (2004) and Fairclough et al. (2013). 
Besides the sorted data, the author also kept a ‘field diary’, where observations were 
noted down while going through the data. The notes also included personal opinions of the 
author, interesting findings and ideas for analysis. These notes were eventually incorporated 
within the analysis and formed basis for some arguments.  
The data quoted hereunder in results is coded according to the following format: 
(Language[E/U]) (Date[DDMMYYYY]) _ (Number of column published on the same day) 
(Timeline[a/b/c]) 
A more detailed index is collected in the appendix and contains the following 
information on all quoted columns: Author, Name of Newspaper, Date, Complete title. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Other categories or overlapping categories could also have been developed. However, for the arguments 
discussed in this thesis, all data fits into the chosen categories. 
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Chapter 5.4: Ethical considerations 
Ethical standards were maintained while collecting the data. All of the columns were 
retrieved from public archives on the newspaper’s websites and can be accessed and checked 
for, if required. Since the data is all in the public domain, no special ethical considerations 
were necessary. 
Chapter 6: Description of data 
Chapter 6.1: Proportion 
A total of 128 articles were broken down into codes after further filtering them. 
 The data was analyzed with the following controls: Language and Timelines. The two 
languages in the data were English and Urdu. The timeline of events was divided into 3 
portions:  
1. Event A included articles from November 20, 2010 (the day Salman Taseer met Asia 
Bibi) to January 4th, 2011 (the day he was assassinated)  
2. Event B included all the court proceedings of Mumtaz Qadri from the session court 
ruling on February 14, 2011 to the dismissal of his presidential pardon on Feb 22, 
2016, after both the high court and the supreme court maintained the original ruling 
3. Event C included writeups published after the execution of Mumtaz Qadri. 
 
Chapter 6.2: Differences in the use of adjectives between the two languages 
The choice of words used to describe 1) Asia Bibi, 2) the Blasphemy Laws, and 3) 
Mumtaz Qadri offers insight into two things: a) what the authors themselves believe about the 
Laws and b) their freedom to voice opinions in view of the paper’s readership. As Mumtaz 
Qadri only becomes part of the narrative onwards of Timeline B, the differences in adjectives 
for him are discussed later.  
There was a stark difference between the descriptions in the two newspapers. As 
indicated above, Dawn pursues left of center policies and its readership mostly includes the 
elites of the society. A wide array of adjectives were used to describe the case of Aasia Bibi. 
A majority of the columnists were greatly sympathetic towards Aasia Bibi. The very first 
column published on 20th of November 2011 called her ‘hapless’ while terming her 
Language Timeline A Timeline B Timeline C 
English 7 (16%) 34 (67%) 10 (20%) 
Urdu  12 (16%) 55 (71%) 10 (13%) 
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predicament ‘disgusting’. This article was published on the day Salman Taseer met Asia Bibi 
for the first time and hence is not a projection of the meeting and press conference that took 
place after it was published. However, it does offer the viewpoint of time preceding Salman 
Taseer’s involvement. Given the columnist was able to call a blasphemy accused “hapless,” 
and the accusation on her as “disgusting,” it highlights the freedom he had (with respect to 
his readership) to voice his opinion on the controversial Law.  
Moving forward in the timeline, the adjectives maintain the same tone, staying 
strongly critical. While discussing the Blasphemy Laws, the authors termed them as “poorly 
drafted,” “astonishing,” “ambiguous,” “controversial,” “…a wrong inflicted on Pakistan’s 
minorities,” “draconian” and called their existence “sordid” and a “monstrosity.” Majority of 
these columnists saw the Laws as dangerous and prone to societal anarchy citing previous 
cases of blasphemy. It is important to remember that these descriptions are in line with the 
discourse that came about after Salman Taseer’s press conference, where he termed Aasia’s 
sentence “strict” and “cruel.” To sum it, during event A, the Dawn columnists seemed 
unanimous in openly criticizing the Laws.  
According to a report by International Media Support, Daily Jang has a moderate 
conservative leaning and due to its wide circulation, it can be seen as representing the views 
and opinions of the majority in Pakistan. Looking at the columns with that understanding 
offers insight on the opinions of the majority of Pakistan’s populace. While no one attacked 
Asia Bibi, the columnists in Daily Jang during Event A, were extremely offended by Salman 
Taseer for terming the Blasphemy Laws as a “black law.” The columnists insisted that the 
proclamation was tantamount to spreading fitna (tribulation) in the society and was a 
propaganda against the Muslim ideology of the country. All columnists insisted that the Laws 
were a strong impediment to anarchy as they stopped people from taking law into their own 
hands. The columnists further insisted that the Laws actually protected the minorities by 
ensuring that an authority confirmed the accusation before imposing a punishment. Yet again, 
the majority were seen to be unanimous in recognizing the Laws as something that ensured 
order and peace within the society. An extract from a column published on 25th of December 
2010 summarizes the argument in these words: “This Laws provides protection to many 
people. One has to wait for the decision of the court and the implementation of its ruling. 
Otherwise, in case of blasphemy, every faithful believes that they are fully capable to act: 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
27 
 
when they see, hear something (blasphemous), they can follow the footsteps of Hazrat Umer 
Farooq32 and prove his faith (by executing the blasphemer).”  
Timeline B onwards, columnists from the Dawn were seen to slightly reorient their 
discussions by focusing more on the murder of Salman Taseer than an outright criticism of 
the Blasphemy Laws. The debate around the Laws seemed to revolve around their nature and 
potential alteration and less on a blatant call for their removal. The columnists termed the 
Blasphemy Laws as “man-made,” “medieval,” “vague” and claimed that they, “in their 
current form,” fueled bigotry.  
The dominant narrative in Daily Jang’s columns for the same timeframe however 
emphasized that the Laws were spiritual and an essential part of a Muslim’s individual and 
societal psyche. While neither newspaper published any column that explicitly supported 
Mumtaz Qadri’s actions, a majority in Daily Jang columns did insist that the murder only 
took place because a) Taseer had intervened in the process of the court and b) the state, due to 
its failure to fully implement the Laws, was responsible for any anarchy. It is important to 
note here that neither newspaper’s columnists were unanimous in their opinions for Timeline 
B and C. Exceptions were observed in both cases, where some columnists in Daily Jang 
admitted that the Laws were leading to anarchy. Similarly, some columnists in Dawn 
emphasizing that there was a deeply religious connection with the Laws by quoting 
scriptures,  rebuked Salman Taseer for being careless with his words. The fact that there is a 
relative diversity and variation in opinions amidst the same newspapers is an interesting 
finding and will be elaborated upon later in the discussion. 
Chapter 6.3: Religion/Religious Authorities 
The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and Daily Jang columnists speak 
about/refer to Religion/Religious authorities throughout timelines A, B and C. 
Timeline A (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws): 
Dawn Newspaper. For timeline A, the columnists in Dawn, addressing the audience 
that identifies with ‘‘muslimness,’’ expressed concern on how the religious leaders misused 
their influence. They recognized the significant role of Ulemas (Religious leaders) as 
opinion-makers in the society and gave examples of this. For instance, a columnist, reminded 
the reader of a certain episode on a private TV channel where the invited Ulemas were 
                                                          
32 Hazrat Umer Farooq was the second caliph of Islam. According to tradition, Prophet Muhammad passed a 
decision on a matter. One of the parties refused to accept Muhammad’s decision. Umer Farooq found this 
disrespectful to Muhammad and beheaded the non-compliant man. A verse (4:65) was revealed later that 
justified Umer’s anger and required Muslims to give in to Muhammad’s decisions without argument.  
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speaking about Ahmadis33. The TV anchor, as per the columnist, “almost urged” the Ulemas 
“to declare the Ahmadis as wajibulqatal (heretics worthy of death).” Within days two 
Ahmadis were murdered (E20112010_1a). While discussing the hurried legalities, when the 
Laws were implemented, a columnist claimed that there was no proper debate on the issue as 
their proponents insisted that punishment on blasphemy was a nondebatable subject. 
However, the same columnist also quoted Mr. Ismail Qureshi, the law minister in the 
government that implemented the Laws, as saying that “some Ulemas argued that blasphemy 
was a forgivable offence” (E25122010_1a). This difference of opinion was not deliberated 
upon. 
The columnists writing during Timeline A were very optimistic about the bill 
presented in the national assembly by Sherry Rehman34 who was termed “courageous” 
(E30122010_1a). They appealed to their readers to pressurize their local representatives to 
support the bill in the parliament. Later, commenting on the petition against Rehman filed in 
the Supreme Court, a columnist expressed dismay on the power the “orthodox elements” 
could exercise on a prominent member of National Assembly. The same columnist blamed 
the country’s media, military and judiciary for tolerating the increasing influence of the 
orthodox mindset (E31122010_1a). Other columnists urging on the same narrative blamed 
the state for shrinking the options and avenues available to the segment of the society which 
would want the Laws to be amended. By either ignoring their growing power, appeasing to 
them for political purposes or simply being intimidated by them, they columnist argued that 
the state allowed the “vocal minority” to drown out the views of the majority. For instance: 
Even if it is assumed that the majority of Pakistanis would support the amendments to 
the blasphemy law, the tools at their disposal to hold back the vocal minority are 
despicably meager. (E04012011_1a) 
Daily Jang Newspaper. The columnists in Daily Jang mostly spoke about the Law’s 
spiritual roots in Timeline A. The narrative was dedicated to counter Taseer’s remarks of 
calling the Laws as “black law” and his claim that the death penalty was too harsh as a 
punishment. Some of the columnists while appealing to the ‘muslimnees’ identification of the 
reader, mentioned quotes from the Quran and hadith (sayings and actions of Prophet 
                                                          
33 A sub-sect of muslims. Please see Chapter 3 for more details 
34 Sherry Rehman is a woman politician belonging to the Pakistan People Party, a centre-left party. Rehman is 
considered one of the most liberal political leaders in Pakistan polarity and has often spearheaded bills that 
seek rights for women, minorities etc. She embodies the ideal of a liberal, modern, slightly western-oriented 
political leader. Most of the controversies around her have been due to this label. 
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Muhammad) to justify the Laws. For instance, a columnist declared that “in the light of 
Muslim history, there is only one punishment for one who blasphemes against Prophet 
Muhammad: death” (U29112010_2a). Other columnists emphasized on the respect Prophet 
Muhammad deserved, insisting that “only Prophet can forgive the blasphemer” 
(U28112010_2a, U30112010_2a). Some columnists compared the Blasphemy Laws with 
Holocaust laws, inquiring why the former got a different reaction even when both pertained 
to religious sentiments. For instance: 
Check the contradiction that including France, Germany, Australia, Switzerland, 
Holland and Israel many countries consider denial of Holocaust illegal and yet if 
Blasphemy Laws in Muslim countries declare defamation of Prophet Muhammad 
illegal, proponents of human rights start complaining (U29112010_1a). 
Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer): 
Dawn Newspaper. Identifying readers as civilized people, the columnists in Dawn 
drew a distinct wedge between them and the “religious parties,” “religious right,” 
“extremists” and the “fundamentalists.” While the columnists often seemed worried about the 
“revulsion deficit” they recognized that those “who speak for justice” become “vulnerable to 
a ritual sacrifice” (E11012011_1b, E13012011_1b, E28012011_1b). They condemned 
“Ulemas” and “religious parties” for condoning Qadri’s actions by either refusing to 
condemn the act or for “supporting what the assassin has done” (E07012011_2b). The 
columnists in Dawn also criticized the government and other state infrastructure for not 
pushing back against ‘fear-mongering fundamentalists’ (E11012011_1b). While many rooted 
Ulema’s political involvement in General Zia-ul-Haq’s35 government, they offered different 
reasons for the lasting relevance of the ideology today. Some columnists wrote that these 
groups managed to gain an audience because they gave an impression that “a godless, 
secular, westernized left (was) trying to take the country away from its traditional -Muslim 
and Islamic roots” and they alone held a “monopoly on religious matters” (E13012011_1b, 
E15012011_2b). Others insisted that the religious parties intimidated those who challenged 
them “using threats…instead of logic” and then, used this fear as a “route to power” 
(E07012011_1b, E05012011_1b). However, there were others who had a different answer to 
why these groups remained powerful. For instance: 
                                                          
35 An army dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq was very religious and infused religious laws in the constitution during 
his tenure. He is largely credited for the increased intolerance in Pakistan today. Please see Chapter 3. 
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A combination of a population raised on a diet of hate, mistrust and distorted beliefs; 
a state system that is invested in perpetuating certain kinds of mindsets; a political 
class that is too self-absorbed to think about overhauling state and society; and the 
imperatives of ratings, subscriptions and ad revenue — all these factors combine to 
ensure a certain kind of media output, the dominance of a particular kind of 
worldview. (E28012011_1b) 
Explanations offered by such columnists credited the environment available to such 
groups as pretext to their relevance. In such narratives, the State itself was held largely 
responsible for “appeasing” the “fundamentalists” by giving into their world view. The State 
was constantly criticized for being subdued on policies and principled stands. For example, 
the bill presented by Sherry Rehman on amendment of the Blasphemy Laws was dropped 
after Taseer’s death as the government offered “no support for the bill” (E10012011_1b). 
Similarly, the government was criticized for disallowing a motion condemning the murder of 
Taseer (E31012011_1b). By underplaying its reaction to the murder of Taseer, the columnists 
accused the state of “legitimizing the extremists’” version of Islam (E09022011_1b).  The 
blame, however. was not targeted to the current government alone. Previous governments, 
both civilian and military, were indicated to have “shut their eyes to what (was) being taught 
at educational institutions” and doing little to “oppose the infrastructure of Jihad” 
(E07012011_1b, E06012011_1b). Moreover, the judiciary too got a share of the blame as it 
seldom punished “ideological killers” leading to the institution’s failure to “bring to justice 
those who dispense justice based on their myopic reading of Islam” (E07012011_1b, 
E03032011_1b). Television media and Urdu newspapers were also criticized for giving more 
coverage to hard-liners for better ratings (E15012011_2b, E07012011_1b, E14032011_1b).  
Similarly, the columnists blamed the military for being “fundo-supporting”36 and considering 
the “jihadis” as “assets” to fight their proxy wars against Pakistan’s enemies (E06012011_1b, 
E10012011_1b). 
Some of the columnists, however, took a different tone by identifying the readers as a 
peaceful ummah (Muslim community) and arguing that “extremists” and “fundamentalists” 
did not represent true Islam. Islam, such columnists argued, historically “preached tolerance 
and diversity of faith in the most unequivocal terms” (E03032011_1b). Similar narratives 
highlighted how the Prophet Muhammad managed to nurture and sustain a peaceful society 
                                                          
36 A derogatory term in English for fundamentalist extremists  
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in Madina37 along with the Jews. Islam was recognized here as a liberator, a religion bringing 
liberty and freedom which was before restricted to the Jewish population. For instance, the 
Jews were said to be living under Muslim “protection” free from “prosecution at the hands of 
the medieval Christians in Europe and Byzantium” (E03032011_1b). Hence, it was argued 
that the followers of Islam had no religious justification to discriminate, attack or kill non-
Muslims. Criticizing the Blasphemy Laws, which were recognized to target the non-Muslim 
population, some columnists, quoting the “more sober Islamic Scholars”, argued that these 
Laws had “few, if any, historical and theological precedents or justifications” 
(E08012011_1b). Urging the Ummah to follow the right teachings of Islam, such columnists 
declared that the “practitioners of violence in the name of religion...brought Islam into 
disrepute” (E03032011_1b). 
Daily Jang Newspaper. It is in Timeline B, where the most contrast is observed 
between the columnists (and the assumed) readership between the two newspapers. While the 
columnists in Daily Jang used religion as an authority in several ways, the imagery mostly 
stayed consistent where there was a clash between the “West” and Islam or a clash between 
the “liberal” segments and “traditional” segments within the Pakistani society. A majority of 
the columnists described the “liberals” as “secular,” “foreign educated,” and “faithless” 
“enemies of Islam” who wanted to “dereligionize” the society. For instance: 
Pioneers of enlightenment, NGO funded liberals, vocal, more educated, more 
endowed economically, elite, better connected with global networks, close to western 
education usually have a greater coverage on media. Due to connections, these people can 
also be seen as part of the global propaganda machinery which is helped by the international 
media industry (U09012011_1b). 
  All columnists, regardless of their views on the murder of Salman Taseer, insisted 
that the Blasphemy Laws were an essential part of Islam and must remain as part of the 
country’s constitution. The narratives firmly established the Laws as “holy laws” basing their 
roots in religious scripture and religious and national history. Appealing to the muslimness 
identification of the readers, these columnists used three authorities to justify the existence of 
the Laws: religion, history and their support amongst the Pakistani populace. The columnists 
insisted on the spirituality of the Laws by quoting numerous passages from Quran as well as 
sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad and his companions. In such arguments, the 
                                                          
37 A city in Saudia Arabia. Prophet Muhammad migrated to Madinah and established an Islamic way of 
governance there. 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
32 
 
imagery was that of the ‘liberal fascists38’ and “seculars” were trying to undermine Islam for 
instance U16012011_3b, U07012011_4b, U09012011_1b and U12012011_4b. Several 
columnists used the example of Prophet Muhammad’s conquest of Makkah39 to put to end to 
any argument against the Blasphemy law. According to the ‘well-sourced’ hadiths, Prophet 
Muhammad, on his conquest of his hometown, Makkah, forgave everyone except those who 
“mocked” and “jeered” at him. While quoting the Quran, some columnist referred to verses 
where ‘God himself was angry at those who insulted Prophet Muhammad’ (U10012011_2b). 
The respect for Prophet Muhammad and hence the Blasphemy Laws was taken in these 
narratives as one of the two foundations of Islam and indeed “a matter of faith” 
(U08012011_2b). The Blasphemy Laws, these columnists argued, were holy laws, so it was 
meaningless to debate on them (U06012011_2b). One columnist, angry at Salman Taseer’s 
attempt at putting the Laws to discussion, termed him simply “unworthy to (even) talk about 
them” (U16012011_3b). Another columnist opinioned that the existence of Laws was based 
on concrete religious facts so they didn’t even require an “ijtihad”40 (U10012011_2b).  
These same columnists and others also used historical events as authorities for their 
arguments. The historical events cited to support the existence of the Laws usually revolved 
around Iqbal41. For instance, one columnist detailed an incident where a student of Iqbal 
called Prophet Muhammad “sahib” (sir). Iqbal found this very disrespectful and demanded 
the student to leave. According to the columnist, Iqbal was in a disturbed mental state due to 
this for many days afterwards (U11012011_1b). Similarly, some columnists used Jinnah as a 
historical authority by insisting that the Laws were in line with his vision of the country. 
According to these narratives, Jinnah recognized that such sensitive matters required special 
laws and he himself was a proponent for them. For instance: 
…. (In one incident) where everyone wanted to give a shoulder to the dead body of a 
person who killed for Prophet Muhammad’s honor, there was shooting by the British 
(security). Jinnah insisted that it was an error of judgement and people should be more 
careful about such sensitive matters (U21012011_1b).  
                                                          
38 A derogatory term used to describe Pakistanis with liberal views 
39 A city in Saudia Arabia and Prophet  Muhammad’s birthplace. He migrated from Makkah to Madina where 
he established a form of Islamic government. Later he went back to Makkah and ‘conquered’ it. 
40 vague issues are open to religions debate amongst scholars which is known as Ijtehad 
41 Allama Muhammad Iqbal holds an important position in the history. He is taken as the philosophical father 
of the country and is said to have been the first one to dream of its existence. A poet, his poems dealt with, 
amongst other topics, Muslim identity, relation with God and the political place of Islam. 
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Another columnist emphasized that Jinnah was a deeply religious person who was 
always “ba waduh” (in ablution) and offered “tahajjud” prayers (extra midnight prayers) 
(U09012011_2b). This implied that the Blasphemy Laws would have made perfect sense to 
him. These accounts especially challenged those who insisted that Jinnah wanted a secular 
state.  
Finally, some columnists also tried to justify the existence of the Laws in the 
constitution of Pakistan with statistics. These columnists employed the democratic principle 
of majority as an authority in their narrative, insisting that the Laws correctly represented the 
views and opinions of the majority of Pakistan’s population. According to these columnists, 
as many as 90%-98% of the country’s population agreed on the Laws and did not want any 
changes in them (U08012011_1b, U08012011_2b, U08012011_4b). Critically, the 
columnists did not translate devotion to Prophet Muhammad as only emotional. Trying to 
appeal to the rational identification of the reader, they insisted that the capital punishment 
was completely rational (U16012011_3b). Those who discouraged Qadri-like actions 
suggested that he got emotional but that others shouldn’t and let the state and judiciary punish 
the blasphemer for instance U06012011_2b, U08012011_1b.  
While no columnist explicitly termed Salman Taseer’s murder as a celebratory event, 
a large majority of the columnists in Daily Jang did not condemn it either. Again, different 
authorities were used for different actor identifications. To appeal to the readers as part of the 
muslimness, the columnists cited religious scripture that not only justified the Laws but also 
rationalized the award of capital punishment (U10012011_2b). These columnists insisted that 
the case of blasphemy was unique and should not be thought of “conventionally” 
(U07012011_4b). “The devotion just isn’t emotional but is a result of 1400 years long 
studies, caution, research, and agreement” (U16012011_3b). And again: 
“…attempts are being made to normalize blasphemy within the society by 
encouraging tolerance, love, acceptance and forgiveness.  However, 800 million 
emotional Muslims are not so naïve that they forget the love for Prophet Muhammad” 
(U11012011_1b). 
Appealing to the muslimness identification of their readership, the columnists blended 
events of history in the narratives, embellishing them with spirituality. For instance, one 
columnist gave the back story of Ilm-ud-din 42where he told that Ilm-ud-din and his friends 
                                                          
42 Ilm-ud-din killed the publisher of a blasphemous book in 1923 in British controlled India. His action 
prompted the British to put an early version of the Blasphemy Laws in the Indian Penal Code. Ilm-ud-din holds 
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tossed a coin three times to decide who would commit the murder and all three times, he 
won; implying that he was destined by God to commit the act. The author further narrated 
that when his body was exhumed after 15 days, it was still fresh and no decomposition had 
taken place (U12012011_3b). Another columnist dedicated a long narrative glorifying Amir 
Cheema, a Pakistani student studying in Germany, who, in 2006, tried to attack the editor of a 
German newspaper who printed blasphemous cartoons of Prophet Muhammad and, 
eventually, committed suicide in the jail. Interviews and conversations with Amir’s father 
were repeated in the column dedicated to admiring the “incomparably noble” act his son had 
committed (U19012011_1b). One columnist dictated the Ummah to not act like the followers 
of Jesus who “left him alone when he was crucified.” The columnist reminded the reader that 
“a real and passionate follower of Prophet Muhammad must be ready to give away his life for 
Him” (U11012011_1b). Some of these columnists quoted western scholars, with special 
emphasis on their alma meters to engage the portion of the audience who associated 
themselves with the identification of being civilized and educated, and resonated with the 
academic hierchy as imagery to their thoughts (U11012011_1b, U16012011_3b).  
However, a small percentage of the columnists were also critical of the Ulemas. 
While, yet again, none criticized the Laws or questioned their inclusion in the constitution, 
there were those, who appealing to the reader identification of being civilized, expressed their 
criticism of Qadri actions; for becoming emotional and taking the law into his own hand 
(U06012011_2b, U08012011_2b). Appealing to the Muslim identification of the readership, 
they also cited a saying of Prophet Muhammad where he said that one murder was equal to 
the murder of mankind (U08012011_2b). Some suggested that the hype around Qadri was a 
strategic, political move by the religious right, who were unable to be significant politically 
before that. For instance, one columnist wondered if the religious parties, who could never 
unite and hence failed to gain any momentum politically, had finally found a common ground 
(U12012011_1b, U16012011_2b). Others were less critical and seemed to appreciate their 
inclusion, insisting that it was important to mainstream religious leaders politically. They’d 
managed to stop the government from planned revision of the Blasphemy Laws and which 
was an achievement on its own. They were advised to refrain from “violent protests” to not to 
give “liberal fascists” fuel for their “poisonous propaganda” (U07022011_1b).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
an integral position in the discourse supporting the Blasphemy Laws and is often quoted as a justification for 
Qadri-like actions. Please see Chapter 3. 
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Timeline C (Qadri executed): 
Dawn Newspaper. The columnists in Dawn writing during timeline C appeared 
defiant and relieved. While there was the “moral quandary” of how to react to an execution, 
all saw the hanging as a much-needed strong statement from the state (E01032016_1c). “So 
ended a tragic and sordid chapter of Pakistan’s history: its fight against extremist vigilantes 
who believe they have the right to kill,” wrote one columnist (E02032016_1c), a few days 
after the execution of Qadri. Appealing to the segment of readership, who were part of this 
struggle as well, the columnists were seen to highlight the moral high ground their success 
entailed. For instance, one columnist detailed that Qadri’s actions were neither “Islamic nor 
moral, as both Islamic law and our Constitution leave no room for vigilantism” 
(E16032016_1c). Appreciating the state for being on the “right path,” the columnists seemed 
optimistic about the future. Eventually, one columnist predicted, Pakistan could “take its 
place in the community of democratic modern nations where all it citizens enjoy equal rights 
regardless of their faith, gender or ethnicity” (E05032016_1c). The “swiftness of Qadri’s 
execution” surprised most of the columnists especially as the current government was 
historically center-right. The columnist justified this change in attitude of the government and 
the burst of “courage” on the backing it received from the military and the courts. For 
instance: 
The state seemed to have virtually vanished, as a murderer was turned into a cult 
figure encouraging others of his ilk to kill in the name of faith. The apex court verdict 
was an attempt to restore the supremacy of the law… perhaps it was also to do with 
the military’s backing for the National Action Plan to counter terrorism and violent 
religious extremism (E09032016_1c) 
However, an equal half of the narrative was dedicated to ponder over the “larger 
debate” on how extremist elements had gained momentum during Qadri’s trial and after his 
execution. The columnists pointed out how Qadri, in his life and death had brought different 
religious parties and factions together. There was a competition, one columnist claimed, to 
show “which political party was best represented at the funeral” (E4032016_1c, 
E05032016_1c). As “religious politics survives on continuous social activism,” some 
columnists were afraid that the religious parties will “exploit religious sentiments for political 
purposes” (E13013016_1c). The state was urged to keep vigilant and put a stop to their 
growing activisms.  
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Daily Jang Newspaper. Columnists in Daily Jang were clearly dejected and did not 
see Qadri’s execution as a success in any form. Some of the columnists complained that even 
though the government tried to weaken the reaction to Qadri’s hanging, the large crowd at his 
funeral revealed that the punishment failed to bring a “change in the mindset” 
(U03032016_2c). If that’s the objective, they pointed out, “factories that preach hatred” 
needed to be shut down (U05032016_1c). However, other columnists had a different 
response to the execution. “Pakistan is unique in the Muslim world because it was blessed 
with the most love for the Prophet Muhammad” wrote one columnist. Hence, people would 
be offended if someone insulted Him. “Qadri too, like a typical Pakistani, felt offended and 
could not tolerate what Taseer said” (U04032016_1c). Another columnist, touching on the 
nationalist and muslimness identification of the readers, asked if they would be offended if 
someone said anything against Jinnah. If so, the columnist pleaded, why wouldn’t one react 
when Prophet Muhammad was insulted? (U11032016_1c). A columnist insisted that had the 
government not been in such a hurry to execute Qadri, the Ulemas would have come up with 
a better arrangement for both the parties such as deet (blood money). Clearly, the columnist 
did not agree with the execution of Qadri and pointed towards the questionable intentions of 
the government (U04032016_1c). Such columnists contextualized their arguments in the 
imagery of a clash between the “West” and Pakistan where the former influenced the 
government to act. More of this imagery is observed in the writeups pertaining to law and 
international influence (see below), where these columnists questioned the state’s 
commitment to local laws as compared to pressure from international entities.  
Chapter 6.4: Historical accounts 
The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and Daily Jang columnists speak 
about/refer to Historical accounts throughout timelines A, B and C. 
Timeline A (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws): 
Dawn Newspaper. There were a few references made to historical accounts by Dawn 
columnist in Timeline A. One columnist speaking about Jinnah’s 11th August 1946 speech 
insisted that not many amongst the clerics in the country were trained to accept Jinnah’s 
views. The columnist said:  
But talk to clerics or students today, and they will look at you in disbelief and even 
anger if you impute secularism to the founder of Pakistan. In their view, he created 
Pakistan in the name of Islam, and not for the Muslims of the subcontinent. 
(E31122010_1a) 
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 Another columnist gave a generic conclusion on the historical misuse of the 
Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. Blaming the State for not keeping a check on how the Laws 
were used to target non-Muslims, the columnist also complained that the policing and justice 
system failed to protect the accused even while they were in jail (E20112010_1a). While 
discussing the formation, and passing of the Blasphemy Laws, another columnist reminded 
the reader that even the Law minister of the time, Mr. Ismail Qureshi, confessed that “many 
Islamic-minded members of the Assembly did not wholly agree with the bill because they 
thought imprisonment for life was sufficient punishment for blasphemy” (E25122010_1a). 
This legal account provides important historical insight which is why it is referred here and 
will also be referred under the “Law and Legal” authority.  
Daily Jang Newspaper. A columnist in an effort to emphasize how the law of the land 
for a Muslim population always had to be rooted in the Quran and Sunnah, claimed that the 
subcontinent was always ruled under Islamic law (U28112010_2a). The Mughals, the author 
insisted, were pious Muslim rulers who ruled strictly in line with the teachings of the Quran 
and Sunnah. There was a brief gap during the English rule in the subcontinent but Pakistan 
again reverted back to the custom of their geographical lineage by becoming an Islamic 
republic with laws such as the Blasphemy Laws. Similar narratives were observed in other 
columns, where the writers narrated incidents of Islamic history where the Blasphemy Laws, 
in some form, were exercised. One columnist told the story of a Caliph during the Usmania 
Caliphate, who warned the French of war against them if they didn’t ban a blasphemous 
theatrical play. According to this columnist, France stopped the play and was left admiring 
the Caliph for his love and devotion towards his prophet (U07122010_1a). While talking 
about Salaudin Ayubi43, a columnist traced the creed of Pakistani Muslims back to him and 
demanded the readers to stay true to the lineage (U30112010_1a).  
A majority of the columnists paid homage to Illm-ud-din. As described in the history 
section of this document, it was Ilm-ud-din’s case that prompted the British to include the 
blasphemy law in its Indian penal code. All the mentions of Ilm-ud-din also mentioned 
Allama Iqbal’s reaction to the case. Allama Iqbal, as mentioned before, is recognized as the 
philosophical founder of Pakistan and his legacy plays a major role in formation of the 
Pakistani identity. Iqbal, who led his funeral prayers, revered Ilm-ud-din for his actions and 
                                                          
43 Salaudin Ayubi is a famous historical figure in Islamic history. He fought against and defeated the crusaders.  
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regretted that he himself could not do the same. Earlier, he’d requested Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah44 to represent Ilm-ud-din in court. 
Some columnists, who wanted to cool the temperature around Taseer, reminded the 
reader that he was the son of a pious man. “Salman Taseer’s father was a renowned Muslim 
and worldly scholar and friends with Maulana Attaullah Shah Bukhari”45 (U28112010_1a). 
How could, the columnist asked the audience, the son of a friend of Maulana Attaullah Shah 
Bukhari do something against Islam? Another, columnist gave Salman Taseer’s father a 
nationalist shade by reminding the reader that he “was also a part of the Kashmir 
independence struggle by writing poems in its favor” (U28112010_1a). 
Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer): 
Dawn Newspaper. Dawn columnists employed different actor identifications when 
they used history as an instrument to convince the reader. Dismayed over the approach the 
country had taken, the columnists spent considerable column space trying to argue that the 
Pakistan of today was not the state the country’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned. 
“We failed the nation, and most of all we failed the creed of the man who made this nation” 
said one columnist (E22012011_1b). Appealing to the civilized nationalist of the country, the 
columnists reminded the readers of what Jinnah said in his speeches about the responsibility 
of the state towards the country’s minorities. For instance: 
No civilized government can be run successfully without giving minorities a complete 
sense of security and confidence. They must be made to feel that they have a hand in 
government and to this end must have adequate representation in it (E16012011_1b). 
Hence the state was held responsible for ensuring that the minorities don’t feel “any 
apprehension of any injustice being done to them” (E16012011_1b). With these verbatim, the 
columnists reminded the State to take its role as a protector of the minorities. Some, however, 
insisted on the more secular version of statehood, where the state stood neutral to religious 
differences. Using Jinnah again, such columnists insisted that the founder “did not want to 
mix state matters and religion” (E07012011_2b). Blaming the State for the division in the 
society, they claimed that the discrimination apparent in society today was a result of an “us” 
and “them” approach which was historically “state enforced” (E30032015_1b). Amongst 
them, one columnist was found to also use religious history to convince the reader of the 
                                                          
44 The founder of Pakistan. Please see Chapter 3. 
45 Maulana Attaullah Shah Bukhari was a founding father of Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam, a movement historically 
known to be against the Ahmaddiya movement.   
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rights of the minorities. Appealing to the muslimness identification of the reader, this 
columnist insisted that “so far as we are concerned, our own history and our Prophet 
Muhammad has given the clearest proof that non-Muslims have been treated not only justly 
and fairly but generously” (E30032015_1b). 
Daily Jang Newspaper. For timeline B, the columnists in Daily Jang infused religion 
with history and simultaneously appealed to the actor identifications of muslimness, Civilized 
and nationalist amongst their readership. As mentioned, the columnists in Daily Jang 
recounted previous incidents of blasphemy and their reactions. They cited the cases of Ilm-
ud-din and Amir Cheema. Appealing to the patriotic Pakistani, the writers used historical 
national figures such as Iqbal and Jinnah to provide context to their arguments. Iqbal was 
shown as a strong proponent of the need to ensure respect of Prophet Muhammad and to 
punish those who blaspheme (U06012011_2b, U11012011_1b, U12012011_3b). Jinnah was 
represented as a pious Muslim, who would have supported the Laws (U09012011_2b). 
Answering those who questioned if there was a need for the Blasphemy Laws in a Muslim 
majority country, the columnists used the case of “Heavenly Communism” to support their 
arguments on the affirmative. The “blasphemous” book was published by a lawyer during 
Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure. The book was supposedly very offensive and prompted the movement to 
strike off the choice of life imprisonment as punishment for Blasphemy, leaving only capital 
punishment behind. The columnists appealing to the readers who’d think of the Laws as a 
religious propaganda, reminding them that this particular movement was not headed by a 
religious individual but an ‘open minded’ member of a leftist party. Hence, even the 
“liberals” wanted the Laws and agreed with the punishment. (U11012011_1b). Other 
columnists maintained the same arguments by reminding the reader that the “liberal” Zulifqar 
Ali Bhutto46 too “recognized the importance of Islam” and reflecting on what “the population 
wanted, integrated Islamic values and laws in the country’s constitution” (U24122015_1b). 
The protests against the Laws, according to these columnists, were only “instigated by 
America and Europe” (U11012011_1b). 
  A very small minority employed history as an authority to appeal to the readers by 
infusing religion in the narrative. Citing Jinnah, these columnists stated that Jinnah “was 
opposed to the idea of a theological state.” Another columnist reminded the reader of the rich 
                                                          
46It is notable that Bhutto was the country’s first ‘left-oriented’, self-proclaimed ‘socialist’, leader. For more 
information, please refer to Chapter 3. 
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Muslim history urging the society to be more open minded and tolerant of different views and 
opinions. For instance: 
When we were open-minded back in the 11th century, we weren’t offended with 
people because we understood their different backgrounds. When we became narrow 
minded, that was the downfall of Islam. The society of today is becoming an enemy 
of knowledge. (U09012011_3b) 
Timeline C (Qadri executed): 
Dawn Newspaper. The columnists of Dawn did not use History as an authority in 
timeline C as much as they did in previous timelines. Only one columnist reflected on how 
the “state patronage allowed religious extremism to flourish in this country and produce a 
culture where murder in the name of faith was glorified.” Reminding the state and the reader 
that escaping the repercussions was to be a “long haul,” he urged that it was a much-needed 
exercise. Otherwise, the columnist warned, the spread of extremism and intolerance 
“threatened” the survival of the state (E09032016_1c). 
Daily Jang Newspaper. None of the columnists in Daily Jang touched upon history as 
an authority to make an argument in timeline C. 
Chapter 6.5: Law and Legal 
The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and Daily Jang columnists speak 
about/refer to Law and Legal throughout timelines A, B and C. 
Timeline A (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws): 
Dawn Newspaper. The Laws, according to some columnists who were very critical to 
them, were a result of a hurried and unconstitutional process. One columnist, while 
explaining the history of their implementation, quoted the Law minister of that time saying 
that “many Islamic minded members of the assembly did not wholly agree with the bill 
because they thought that imprisonment for life was sufficient punishment for blasphemy” 
(E25122010_1a). 
Time and time again, many columnists urged that the problems faced by the accused 
were not limited to their treatment during trial. Several of the accused, who were acquitted by 
the courts, had to relocate or would live under tremendous social pressure or be killed by 
some unknown assailants. Blasphemy, in that sense, became a life-long curse that stayed with 
them throughout their lives.  
Daily Jang Newspaper. Daily Jang’s columnists were strictly against Salman 
Taseer’s intervention in Asia Bibi’s case and saw his move as anarchy. Two years earlier, in 
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2009, the judiciary was involved in a historic “Lawyer’s movement” meant to make the 
judicial system free from the influence of politicians. As it was free from these bindings in 
2011, some columnists argued that the strong and independent judiciary was fully capable to 
check any misuses or influence of the Laws, hence there was no need for an intervention by 
the governor. Aasia Bibi, they insisted, was sentenced to death after due legal process not by 
conventional or traditional means such as a fatwa47or a Jirga48 (U25112010_2a). To prove 
this, one columnist dedicated his column to repeating the words of the investigating officer 
with his name and his title, challenging the readers to confirm the content. According to the 
report, Aasia admitted that she had, in fact, committed blasphemy in front of the elders of her 
community and had also sought forgiveness from Qari49Salim, the imam of her village who’d 
lodged the complaint against her. The same columnist then reminded the readers that the 
punishment for death, besides being a unanimous agreement amongst different religious 
groups, had also been agreed upon by both houses of parliament after an “intense debate,” 
and was also recommended by the Federal Shariat Court (U25112010_1a). In another 
column, an author mentioned the name and titles of the judges of the Federal Shariat Court, 
emphasizing on their credentials and explaining how the decision on punishment of death 
was not an outcome of an emotional outburst but was formed after much contemplation by 
seasoned minds. This way, the columnists attempted to convince the readers that the Laws 
and the punishment were in line with both religious traditions and state’s legislative 
requirements. 
Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer): 
Dawn Newspaper. Columnists in Dawn engaging the identification towards being a 
civilized nationalist, used the state law or the constitution as authorities in their arguments. 
The narratives here were strict in questioning why “state functionaries are losing the will to 
uphold the law” even if it dealt with sensitive issues. By being “afraid of checking any 
transgression of the law committed under the cover of belief,” the government was blamed 
for the eventual “extremely deleterious effects” (E09022011_1b). The columnists also 
contested that the judiciary fell short of being “independent, impartial and competent 
tribunal” in blasphemy cases due to security issues. For instance: 
                                                          
47 A religious decree. 
48 A traditional form of court where the elders of the city or the family get together and decide and impose a 
decision. 
49 Title for a religious teacher 
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Judges who hear blasphemy cases are often harassed and threatened to convict the 
suspects. Some judges have reported receiving letters and phone calls warning them 
of attacks against themselves and their families if defendants in blasphemy cases are 
acquitted (E26042015_1b). 
Criticizing the government for this situation, columnists questioned the State’s 
intentions to treat the blasphemy accused fairly. They urged the State to ensure that the “right 
to independent judiciary is (not) reduced to rhetoric.” Using the upholding of Qadri’s 
punishment by the Supreme Court as an authority, the columnists appreciated the reader for 
condemning a “self-professed murderer.” These columnists confirmed that the country’s 
leading judges agreed with them when they ruled that “criticizing blasphemy law does not 
amount to blasphemy” and “no one has the right to take the law into his own hands” 
(E14102015_1b). Other columnists critiqued the Laws and presented a number of issues in 
them. For example, they was termed to be “vague”. This claim was directly in line with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling that “the language of the statute, and, in particular, a statute creating 
an offence, must be precise, definite and sufficiently objective so as to guard against an 
arbitrary and capricious action on part of the state functionaries…” The clarity in the 
language of the Laws was deemed essential both in line with “Article 10-A of the 
Constitution of Pakistan, as well as international human rights law, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (E10042015_1b). The “vague and 
broad wordings of the provision” made the Laws vulnerable to subjective interpretations 
which, in turn, allowed people to exploit them. The narrative, in general, demanded of the 
state to make the language of the Laws more concrete while making the trial process fairer 
with respect to an independent judiciary. 
Daily Jang Newspaper. The columnists in Daily Jang, when using Law as an 
authority, appealed to the readers who identified themselves as law abiding, civilized citizens. 
Not condemning Salman Taseer’s murder, the columnists instead shone light on the fact that 
his actions themselves were anarchical. By stepping in, the columnists contested that he did 
more harm to Asia Bibi’s case than good. For instance: 
Salman Taseer should have respected the verdict of the court and let due process take 
its place even if Asia Bibi was innocent. Higher courts always give accused the 
benefit of the doubt. (U08012011_1b) 
Even those who either knew him personally or admired him, criticized him for his 
stance and actions and term them “unconstitutional” (U12012011_2b). The columnists yet 
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again urged the readers to realize that the Laws were a representation of the view of the 
majority and they formed an “important” part of the country’s legal system (U08012011_1b). 
Moreover, these Laws were not a product of popular support from the religious section of the 
society alone. Walking readers through the formation of the Laws and their evolution, the 
columnists emphasized that “individuals from all walks of life agree with the Laws” 
(U13012011_2b).  
Others provided statistics on the number of accused who were given capital 
punishment. “In 23 years, no one’s been given a death punishment. This proves that either the 
cases were not strong enough or they didn’t hold to the requirements of justice of the law. 
This alone is enough proof of its transparency” (U09012011_1b). Some columnists, however, 
did admit that the Laws were misused, but they were still very critical on those who propose 
their annulment due to the misuse. Such narratives wondered why only the Blasphemy Laws 
were especially “targeted” when numerous other laws were misused (U09012011_1b). 
Furthermore, given the existence of other laws that ensured respect to numerous national 
institutions, the columnists wondered why those who oppose the Blasphemy Laws had issues 
with them alone. For instance: 
The country has many other laws that provide protection against contempt of the 
president, the governors, army, judiciary so why only have issues with the one that 
demands the same for the best of all worlds…Prophet? (U07012011_4b). 
Demanding their continued existence, the columnists offered solutions to avoid their 
misuse. The narratives largely insisted that the execution of judgments on the Laws must be 
through legal procedures and not anarchic, for instance U06012011_2b. Similarly, a 
columnist termed their misuse as the greatest “disservice” done to the Laws 
(U09012011_5b). To counter these, the columnists proposed solutions such as 
complementary laws that could check against their misuse, for instance U09012011_1b, 
U15012011_2b. Such narratives further suggested that any implementation of sharia must 
come through “reform via the state” and not individually (U06012011_2b). However, no 
columnist suggested a direct amendment.  
A column published after the Supreme Court upheld Qadri’s death sentence, called 
the ruling ‘important’ to solve the “issue to intolerance issue in the society which has been 
there for 40 years.” The columnist saw the decision in a wider perspective of the state 
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reestablishing its writ across different fronts50. As a concluding sentence, the columnist 
reiterated the judge when he said that “criticism on Blasphemy Laws is not blasphemy” 
(U14022015_1b). 
Timeline C (Qadri executed): 
Dawn Newspaper. Columnists in Dawn made significant use of Law as authority in 
timeline C. After all, Qadri’s sentencing and hanging was a win for “justice.” The columnists, 
spoke about how the state had to guarantee the rights of the citizens and uphold its 
constitutional commitments.  For instance:  
The state must also establish its credentials as the one entity that is committed to 
enforcing the law without discrimination and restoring law and order to a country 
wracked for years by lawlessness. (E05032016_1c) 
Basing their arguments on the imagery that the “road forward is an inclusive and a 
progressive Pakistan,” the columnists demanded that all political forces must come together 
to ensure rule of law (E03032016_1c). In such a Pakistan, the law will take its due course and 
will be “enforced with single-mindedness of purpose.” The columnists emphasized that the 
judgement given on the Qadri case was not exceptional and the courts simply ruled as they 
would with anyone. Instruments of the state, the columnists reminded the reader, were “not 
individual; they are instead based on procedure and process, the product of which is justice” 
(E2032016_1c). 
Some columnists were dismayed over the support Qadri received from the lawyers 
and judges given they were the forbearers of justice. Another columnist complained how the 
“religious circles” labeled any act of reform as “acts of liberalization” meant to please the 
West’ and hence impeding the process (E13032016_1c). Insisting on the seriousness of the 
situation, one columnist pleaded that attempts need to be made to ensure that “Qadri does not 
morph into a legend to inspire future generations.” The only way to do this, the columnist 
argued, was that the government “found its voice and loudly proclaim what kind of Pakistan 
it is committed to building” and the military “visibly buries its history of using religious 
militancy as a tool in foreign adventures” (E03032016_1c).  
Daily Jang Newspaper. Columnists in Daily Jang, who used Law as authority, 
unanimously pointed towards a foreign power influencing the State to execute Qadri. The 
“swiftness of the execution” had seemingly left these columnists in a shock. Strange, opined 
one columnist, capital punishment takes many years but Qadri got executed in only five 
                                                          
50 The State started an armed campaign in tribal areas on its western border to end terrorism. 
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years. Qadri, this columnist insisted did what he did because the State failed to act on the 
Blasphemy Laws. (U04032016_1c). Another columnist asked why the same “swiftness” was 
not applicable to “the blasphemy convicts, Raymond Davis and those who helped and 
betrayed the country in the Abbottabad raid [by US-led forces, and that resulted in the capture 
and killing of Osama bin Laden] 51” (U03032016_1c). Again, the columnist implied that the 
execution was not unfair and those championing “justice” needed to deal with all criminals in 
the same manner. “What sort of justice is this,” asked the same columnist, “that Qadri will 
get executed while the case of Aasia Bibi gets prolonged?” 
International lens 
The writeup hereunder will present how the Dawn and Daily Jang columnists speak 
about/refer to International lens throughout timelines A, B and C. 
Timeline A: (Taseer critiques Blasphemy Laws) 
Dawn Newspaper. When criticizing the Laws, some columnist compared them with 
international terrorist organizations that were conducting targeted genocides. Building up on 
the claim that the Laws were made specifically to target non-Muslim population, the 
columnists urged that the targeted harassment was similar to what the Islamic State of Iraq 
had declared when they announced that “all Christian centers, organizations and institutions, 
leaders and followers are legitimate targets of the Mujahideen52” (E20112010_1u). 
Writing about the implications of the Laws on  fundamental rights of people, the 
columnists argued that the Laws did not convince human rights advocates of any protection 
to the minorities as is often insisted by their proponents. On the contrary, the activists found 
that the Laws basically provided “an avenue through which all manner of personal or political 
vendettas can be avenged” (E24122010_1a). The same columnists also mentioned that these 
organizations and activists were actively seeking a presidential pardon for Aasia Bibi. Other 
columnists were more worried about the mixed signals the country sent to the international 
community. “We send out simultaneous signals of modernity and medievalism, but at the end 
of the day, the latter drowns out the former,” announced one columnist (E27122010_1a). 
Another insisted that “we have given ourselves (a name), by our own actions most of all… 
not a very good one” (E30122010_1a). Some of the columnists were dejected that the 
                                                          
51 This is in reference to Dr. Shakeel Afridi who helped CIA to confirm Osama Bin Laden’s presence inside the 
house by conducting a fake polio campaign. He has been labelled a traitor of Pakistan for this action. 
52 soldiers of God 
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“conservative opinion” had not taken the Pope’s plea in “proper spirit” (E25122010_1a, 
E20112010_1a).  
Daily Jang Newspaper. The columnists in Daily Jang mostly saw the international 
community as an entity which was at loggerheads against the local traditions. For instance, 
one columnist complained that the international powers were trying to change laws that were 
in accordance with local national opinions (U29112010_1a). Another columnist furthered this 
by saying that the “West” seems to have an obsession for “manipulating the love of Prophet 
Muhmmad from amongst the Muslim communities worldwide” (U05122010_1a). Similarly, 
it was complained that those who go against local or Islamic laws found refuge in “America, 
Europe and Scandinavian countries” where they were offered many luxuries 
(U25112010_2a). Criticizing those who let go of their traditional roots, the columnists 
offered much disdain for them. For instance: 
These times, philosophically, are victim today of the strictly mental approach of 
rationality. Muslims too on being impressed, fall prey to it and lose their faith, their 
devotion towards God and Prophet Muhammad. Instead of gauging oneself and one’s 
actions with the commands of religion, they embrace the European way of thinking 
and in the way, lose their respect and independence. (U30112010_2a). 
Timeline B (Qadri assassinates Taseer): 
Dawn Newspaper. Columnists in Dawn who used International phenomenon as 
authorities, appealed to the civilized nationalist who, they believed, valued international 
conventions and commitments. Although they did not explicitly insist that the Laws 
challenged modernization, their arguments could be seen to imply just that. Most of the 
narratives in such writings, for example, pointed at the contrast of local trends, especially 
those pertaining to the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan, to international expectations.  For 
instance: 
Pakistan’s blasphemy Laws are inconsistent with a number of human rights including 
freedom of expression; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and equal 
protection of the law, which have all been well documented by human rights groups. 
(E01042015_1b). 
The narratives argued that in case of scrutiny, the Laws could easily be “discredited 
within the international rights framework.” Bringing the same argument of ambiguity as 
discussed in the section under Law/Legal, a columnist quoted the October 2010 Freedom 
House report saying that the “Pakistan's law lacks safeguards against abuse since it is vague, 
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offers no clear definitions of blasphemy and has weak evidentiary standards” 
(E09012011_1b). A similar observation was made by Qadir (2014) in his study where he 
showed international comparisons being made to define Pakistan as a ‘civilized’ nation. 
Some columnists also saw the Laws as designed to target the minority population and saw 
them in the context of a religious conflict within the country. Urging the reader to follow 
“Europe and America” in refraining from religious discrimination, one columnist wrote about 
an incident where the U.S. Department of Justice fought “school authorities for the rights of a 
Muslim plaintiff,” staying true to “US constitutional commitments to religious equality and 
freedom”. The columnist “advised” Muslim governments to “stop ranting against the West, 
take a few lessons in citizenship and minority rights from Europe and America” 
(E04022011_1b).  
Pointing out more faults in the Blasphemy Laws and their implementation, some 
columnists reiterated the need for security of judges to ensure an “impartial tribunal.” Citing 
the concern of “the UN special rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary” who visited 
Pakistan in 2012, the columnist reveal that judges in blasphemy cases were either “coerced or 
pressured to decide against the accused” or were “very afraid of public sentiment” 
(E26042015_1b). The same columnists also gave the example of Justice Pervez Ali Shah who 
had to leave the country due to threats on his life after awarding Mumtaz Qadri’s death 
penalty. In other words, the columnists engaged the reader to realize how rulings in cases 
pertaining to the Blasphemy Laws fell short of meeting local or international requirements of 
the “fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial” and hence could not be accepted. 
Daily Jang Newspaper. The narratives in Daily Jang for timeline B depicted the 
imagery of conflict and this shaped most of the arguments and authorities the columnists 
employed. Almost all of the columnists saw a conflict between Islam and the “west.” “West” 
encompassed Europe and America for the columnists. The columnists also found conflicts 
between the “liberals” who were western educated and who “follow(ed) America blindly” 
(U20012011_3b) and the local traditional populace. Another obvious conflict in the narrative 
was between the insistence on rationalism dictated by “western propaganda” and the devotion 
to faith expected of all Muslims. The only mention of NGOs in timeline B was negative 
where they were blamed for “politicizing” the issue “to collect foreign funds” 
(U11012011_1b). The columnists also mentioned Pope Benedict several times and criticized 
him for getting involved in the internal matters of Pakistan. Others called him out for 
ignoring the prosecutions faced by Muslims in “Christian majority” countries 
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(U13012011_1b). The columnists insisted that the Laws do not solely target non-Muslims 
and that calling them “discriminatory” was a “propaganda pursed by the West” 
(U13012011_2b, U06012011_2b). One columnist in Daily Jang insisted that the “west has 
made toying with the religious sentiments of Muslims it’s hobby” (U07012011_4) and 
demanded of the political leaders to put a stop to it.  
Timeline C (Qadri executed): 
Dawn Newspaper. For timeline C, only one columnist used the “international” setting 
as an authority. The emphasis in the narrative was that reforms had to come from within. 
Reflecting on the efforts, which were put in by the international and transnational entities 
throughout the Taseer-Qadri trial, the columnist argued they hadn’t proved fruitful. 
“International perceptions are largely irrelevant,” the columnist opinioned. This was because 
Pakistanis believed in a different “reality”. The only way to reform was to “change the 
reality” so that internal efforts lead the country towards the changes. (E02032016_1c). 
Daily Jang Newspaper. Columnists writing for Daily Jang during timeline C engaged 
the “international” authority on the premise that foreign powers were involved in the 
execution of Qadri. Some of the columnists accused America to be the enforcer of Qadri’s 
execution, for instance U04032016_1c, U13032016_1c. The columnists traced this 
“conversion to liberalization” within the government as well as the army on the influence of 
America as there has been no historical political struggle for this ideology. The columnists 
decried the change and warned the government that this would “further break the country” 
(U03032016_1c).  
 
Chapter 7: Analysis 
Chapter 7.1: Epistemic governance: Imageries 
Chapter 7.1.1: Competing blocs. Epistemic governance builds on a set of 
recognizable imageries. The imageries contextualize the narrative and form a crucial part of 
one’s ‘reality’. Columnists, when trying to put forth an argument, need to do so in line with 
the realities of the audience. The imageries provide backdrop to the arguments and the basis 
on which the columnists can engage in epistemic work. This exercise is almost automatic in 
nature. At times, the columnists engage in epistemic governance consciously, at times 
otherwise. And yet, there is a degree of conformity in the practice. Alasuutari and Qadir 
(2016) suggest that this reliance on imageries is worldwide and is a common trait of modern 
world culture. The columnists hence engage with ‘imageries’ because it simply works. They 
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assume, and indeed correctly so, that the society thinks this way. That, the society 
understands the world in the context of a specific or a series of images and situations. And, 
any line of argument will only make sense if it resonates with those perceived imageries.  
The imageries identified in the columns of Dawn and Daily Jang are widespread. The 
columnists see Pakistan as a very complex society with several fissures, hierarchies and one 
bent on evolving into a modern state. The columnists are seen to present these imageries in 
their narratives as they converse on the Blasphemy Laws throughout the timelines. While the 
idea for the imageries stays the same, at times, the players change across timelines. These 
will be presented later. 
Columnists across the different timelines and newspapers assume that Pakistan is a 
divided society. The divisions are widespread across all social and economic classes. Below 
imageries are enlisted which were observed in the columns of both the newspapers. Imageries 
that were common across timelines or categories were exempted from the list to avoid 
repetition. Each imagery has the category and the timeline stated after it. 
 
 
Dawn Daily Jang 
 Courageous politicians such as Sherry 
Rehman vs Cowardly politicians who stay 
quiet on the Blasphemy Laws (Religion, 
Timeline A) 
 Silent majority that is against the Laws vs 
Vocal Minority (Religion, Timeline A) 
 Vulnerable and peaceful people vs 
Intimidating and violent religious people 
(Religion, Timeline B) 
 Godless, secular left vs Pious, traditional and 
Islamic right (Religion, Timeline B) 
 People who use logic and rationalism vs 
Religious right that disregards logic 
(Religion, Timeline C) 
 Those who see Pakistan in line with Jinnah’s 
11th August Speech vs Those who want to 
delete the speech from archives (History, 
 Islamic scholars who find little historical or 
theological precedents or justifications for 
the Blasphemy Laws vs Those who think 
Blasphemy Laws are an integral part of Islam 
(Religion, Timeline A) 
 Islam vs West (Religion, Timeline A) 
 A Muslim world that respects the Laws vs 
the rest of the world that disrespects the Laws 
and yet respects sentiments on Holocaust 
(Religion, Timeline A) 
 Liberal vs Traditional (Religion, Timeline B) 
 Those who seek to dereligionize, are 
faithless, seculars vs Those who want a 
religious society (Religion, Timeline B) 
 Foreign educated and hence separated from 
local realities vs Local educated traditional 
individuals (Religion, Timeline B) 
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Timeline A) 
 Those who think that Laws specifically target 
Non-Muslims vs Those who don’t (History, 
Timeline A) 
 Those who see State as a protector of 
Minority rights vs Those who undermines 
minority rights (History, Timeline B) 
 Those who want to see the society divided 
into Us (Muslims) and Them (Minorities) vs 
Those who want a unified society 
 Those who follow forced and wrong laws vs 
Those who demand they go through proper 
process (Law, Timeline A) 
 Those who believe that the Blasphemy Laws 
can be criticized vs Those who don’t (Law, 
Timeline B) 
 The Laws must be in line with International 
Human Standards vs Not (Law, Timeline B) 
 Those who see Qadri’s execution as a 
product of law vs Those who don’t (Law, 
Timeline C) 
 Those who take reforms as an internal, 
natural process vs Those who think that the 
reforms are forced by the West (Law, 
Timeline C) 
 Those who see the Law as a tool to avenge vs 
Not (International, Timeline A) 
 The conservative elements that don’t take the 
Pope’s plea in good faith vs Those who do 
(International, Timeline A) 
 Those who see the state give in to 
international expectations of rights vs Those 
who see state as a protector of traditional 
dogmas (International, Timeline B) 
 
 Enemies of Islam vs Saviors of Islam 
(Religion, Timeline B) 
 NGO sponsored propogandist vs True locals 
(Religion, Timeline B) 
 Vocal (educated, elite and hence have a more 
say) vs Poor, uninfluential and subdued 
(Religion, Timeline B) 
 Upholders of enlightenment and modernity 
vs traditionalists (Religion, Timeline B) 
 Globally connected modernists and liberals 
vs local traditionalists (Religion, Timeline B) 
 Elite vs the common Pakistani (Religion, 
Timeline B) 
 Those who believe in well sourced Hadith vs 
Heresy (Religion, Timeline B) 
 A rational Muslim who will let the state 
punish the blasphemer vs an emotional 
Muslims who would punish the blasphemer 
themselves (Religion, Timeline B) 
 Those who believe that the Blasphemy Laws 
are an outcome of emotions alone vs those 
who believe that the Blasphemy Laws are a 
result of 1400 years of studies, caution, 
research and agreement (Religion, Timeline 
B) 
 Followers of Prophet Mohammad who will 
always stay with Him vs Followers of Jesus 
who left Him when he was crucified 
(Religion, Timeline B) 
 Those who will not violently protest and 
hence give more propaganda material to 
liberal fascists vs Those who will be violent 
in reaction (Religion, Timeline C) 
 Liberal fascists waiting on opportunities to be 
propogandist vs normal people (Religion, 
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Timeline C) 
 Law abiding citizens who respect the 
constitution and the Law vs Those who don’t 
(Religion, Timeline C) 
 State infrastructure that punished Qadri vs 
The nationals who still support Qadri 
(Religion, Timeline C) 
 A state expected to respect local laws and 
local views vs A state that goes against local 
laws to appease the west or gives into 
international pressure (Religion, Timeline C) 
 Those who think that the Law of the land 
must be based on Quran and Sunnah vs Not 
(History, Timeline A) 
 
 
 
Observations on the imagery of competing blocs. The imageries collected above 
provide an interesting insight into how the columnists think the society imagines the world. 
As stated above, there were recurring imageries in each newspaper across timelines and 
categories. These were deleted to avoid repetitions. However, as is observed across timelines, 
the bigger picture stays the same. For instance, there is a recurring and strong emphasis on 
the imagery of a conflicting “world” with Pakistan be it in the religious sense, the historical 
sense, through the lens of Law or with respect to international expectations. The content 
changes across the timelines but the imagery stays the same.  
An interesting observation is how the imageries don’t only stay the same across 
timelines and categories but also across newspapers. As has been described in detail already 
in chapter 5, the newspapers reach different demographics and have a different set of 
readership. Dawn usually caters to the elite of the society who are economically and socially 
well-off. This readership is usually well-educated and more accepting of liberal policies. In 
contrast, the Daily Jang newspaper is the most widely read Urdu newspaper and caters to the 
more conservative segment of the society. Its readership is usually less endowed 
economically and socially. In a sense, the two newspapers are on opposite poles of the 
spectrum politically, economically, and socially. And yet, each share the same imagery form: 
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a form where there exists a conflict between competing groups and segments. For Dawn, the 
competing groups are usually the religious extremists—socially backward, illiterate, violent, 
and emotional—vs modern, progressive, educated, and law abiding citizens. For Daily Jang, 
there exists a conflict between the Western educated seculars, anti-Pakistan, anti-nationals 
and anti-Islam vs the patriotic protectors of Islam and traditions. This finding reiterate Qadir 
& Alasuutari (2013), showing that even with varying demographics of the audience and 
readership and regardless of the ideological tendencies and biases of the columnists, the 
method of governance stays the same. All columnists believe in the society’s tendencies to 
conflict and find it convenient to massage these beliefs and shape their arguments in line with 
them to make them more “realistic” to their audience. The study shows that it is immaterial 
whether the columnists are speaking to highly educated English speaking individuals or to 
someone who is Urdu speaking and is deeply religious and a staunch traditionalist. The 
imagery of a conflict eases out the message and merges within the perceived reality of the 
readership. 
 
Chapter 7.1.2: Hierarchy. The columnists also see Pakistan as a society that is 
largely hierarchical. Power falls in many layers and different authorities are presumed by the 
columnists to exercise that power. Circumstances, historical or otherwise, are associated with 
the failure to act by these authorities. As has been observed with the imageries, this 
understanding of a hierarchical infrastructure is neither limited to a newspaper, not is it boxed 
in any timelines. The accounts of these institutions can be found dispersed all around the 
data. 
 The State holds an important position in the narratives for it is held responsible for 
past events, for present conditions and many future expectations are attached to its role. For 
example, the State is held responsible by several Dawn columnists for the rise in strength of 
the “fundamentalists” due to its policies of the past. The State is accused of providing 
“legitimacy and support” to such groups. Similarly, it is blamed to have made the Blasphemy 
Laws part of the constitution in a rushed manner without due debate on them. The columnists 
in Dawn have been especially critical of the government for not being open to bringing any 
amendments in the Laws and being intimidated by the lobbying of religious groups. The 
Dawn columnists vented out their exasperation against the current government due to its 
choice to withdraw its proposals of the Law’s amendments and for hushing down political 
steps that condemned the murder of Taseer. Given this stance, columnists blamed the State 
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for any future “deleterious effects.” In timeline C, the Dawn columnists yet again, put the 
brunt of the narration on the State by commending it for doing the right thing and ensuring 
the rule of law by executing Qadri. These columnists were insistent that the State further 
needs to set a precedent where anyone who challenges its writ is awarded a punishment. Just 
as it must ensure that everyone gets their rights and can live as equal citizens of the country. 
The columnists in Daily Jang too place much weight of their arguments on the 
hierarchical power of the state. In timeline A and B, the columnists use the fact that the Laws 
are part of the constitution of the country as a form of legitimization. In other words, linking 
them to the approval of the state makes them institutionalized. Throughout the narratives, the 
proponents of the Laws stand firmly on this justification in timeline A and B. The State is 
coxed to ensure that the accused are dealt exactly in line with the constitution. The courts too 
have been appreciated for upholding their commitments as legal authorities and awarding 
Aasia Bibi her punishment (of death penalty) as was the requirement of the Laws. These 
columnist have often equated those who oppose the Laws to anarchic/traitor groups such as 
Al-Qaeeda and Taliban. These columnists argue, that both parties do not respect the rule of 
law and don’t respect the constitution of the country. Similarly, they blame the State’s 
inactivity for Qadri’s act. The State, these columnists argue should have implemented the 
Laws as they are in the constitution. These columnists are agitated that in the many years 
since the inclusion of the Laws in the constitution, not one of the accused has been given 
capital punishment. Hence, the columnists argue that if the State does not do its job, the 
inactivity would lead to people like Qadri taking the law in their own hand. In timeline C, the 
columnists of Daily Jang put the brunt of the responsibility on the State and ask why Qadri 
was executed so swiftly? The columnists believe that it did so because it was either under 
pressure from the international community or simply wanted to appease it. 
The presidential pardon is another indication of this representation of hierarchy. The 
day Salman Taseer met Aasia Bibi, he had her sign an appeal for a presidential pardon 
against the death penalty awarded to her. After the Supreme court upheld Qadri’s death 
penalty, he too requested a presidential pardon which was rejected. During the narratives, we 
have many accounts of human rights activists campaigning for a Presidential pardon for 
Aasia Bibi.  
This representation of the State as a truly separate objective entity is problematic. The 
imagery of an all-powerful, individualized objective entity, which is morally and ethically 
higher up than the rest is clearly a natural presumption. This presumption builds the 
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foundations for the narratives of the columnists. However, no modern democratic state works 
that way. In reality, the state is a diffused entity that is dynamic and flexible in its response to 
circumstances (Jessop 2016). People who form the state infrastructure interpret and guide the 
response of state machinery. The columnists seem not to recognize that and see the state in an 
all powerful hierarchical status. This establishes the hierarchical imagery necessary to use 
objects of epistemic work in the narrative.   
 Chapter 7.1.3: Imagery of Progress. The imagery of progress is mostly implicit in 
the columns collected for the data. In a way, the Dawn columnists tend to assume that 
progressiveness is pre-requisite to being civilized. This is most obvious in the narratives 
under “International Lens.” For instance, on the imposition of the Blasphemy Laws and the 
case rulings on such cases, a Dawn columnist says that “We send out simultaneous signals of 
modernity and medievalism” (E27122010_1a). Similarly, another columnist worries about 
the “not a very good’ impression to the outside world the country gave due to these Laws.” In 
timeline B, the comparisons become stronger as the country is shown to have fallen short 
from fulfilling the international expectations attached to it. Yet again, the international trends 
are seen to be the natural way forward as is seen with comparisons to cases in the US and 
elsewhere. The most obvious representation of the imagery of progress is a particular quote 
by a columnist in Dawn where he claims that the ‘road forward is an inclusive and a 
progressive Pakistan’ (E03032016_1c). Clearly, the columnist here believes that societies and 
countries need to evolve; to move forward. This move forward is to be more progressive and 
hence forms the imagery of progress in its most obvious form. 
Like the Dawn columns, there were no explicit imageries of progress in the Daily 
Jang columns. However, one example could be seen using the same imagery of progress. The 
columnists, while criticising the spread of emotionalism within the society, attributed it to 
illiteracy. In other words a more progressive, literate and educated Pakistan would be more 
rational. This, as stated, was a rare example in Daily Jang as usually, the imagery of progress 
was more obvious in the narratives in Dawn. Of course, this leaning has to do with the social 
class of the Dawn readers and columnists. As stated in chapter 5, Dawn does mostly refer to 
the very elite of the society. Hence, the more elite, well-educated and economically and 
socially well-off segment of the society is found to believe more on the evolution of the 
country towards modernism and progressiveness as compare to the rest of the country. 
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Chapter 7.2: Epistemic Governance: Objects of Epistemic Work 
When people try to convince others, they assume that people hold certain imageries and 
assumptions of the world. This allows them to contextualize the narratives. The assumptions 
are based on objects of epistemic work. The objects of epistemic work can be divided into 3 
categories: Ontology, Actor identifications and Norms & Values. 
Chapter 7.2.1: Ontology. The categories of Religion/Religious authorities, Historical 
accounts, Law, and International Lens can be seen as the umbrella ontological categories 
within the data. As explained earlier, the categories were based on the trends observed within 
the data. The arguments used in the narratives were seen to fit into these categories. However, 
the actual composition varied. 
Ontology as an epistemic work acts as authority to knowledge that can then cement 
imageries. Anyone who undertakes epistemic work needs to find authorities of knowledge, 
statistics or institutions that can complement arguments. For the discourse surrounding the 
Blasphemy Laws, the columnists perceive that their audience takes some forms of authorities 
to base their opinions and biases. Hence, they too employ the same objects of epistemic work 
to make their arguments. Yet again, it needs to be remembered that these authorities, much 
like the parent categories, are observed and derived from the data itself. The trends stated 
below are observable within the narratives of the columnists from Dawn and Daily Jang 
respectively. 
Ontology 
Religion/Religious authorities 
Dawn Daily Jang 
 Ulemas as opinion makers 
 Religious Political parties’ role in passing 
the Blasphemy Laws  
 Religious scriptures 
 Ulemas as protectors of religion and 
traditions 
 Religious scriptures 
 Historical accounts of religiosity of leaders of 
the Pakistan Independence movement (Iqbal 
and Jinnah) 
 Accounts of Islamic History 
 Historical accounts of previous blasphemy 
cases with miracles attached to the murderers 
(Ilm-ud-din, Amir Cheema) 
 Majority proportion of supporters of the 
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Laws in the population 
Historical accounts 
 Jinnah’s secular vision and his 11th 
August 1946 speech 
 Historical accounts of previous 
blasphemy cases in Pakistan courts 
 Historical accounts of previous 
blasphemy accusations  
 Historical account of the formation and 
(hurried) implementation of the 
Blasphemy Laws 
 Historical accounts of religious history 
to justify minority rights 
 Historical accounts of Islamic Rule of 
the subcontinent  
 Historical accounts of the times of 
Caliphs 
 Accounts of the case of Ilm-ud-din and 
the reaction of Iqbal and Jinnah 
 Jinnah’s version of a secular Pakistan 
 Taseer’s father’s religious affiliations 
 Historical accounts of previous 
blasphemy cases  
 Historical support for the Laws from 
Liberal political readers 
Law and Legal 
 Law Minister  
 Social apprehension around the trials of 
blasphemy accused 
 Role of State as a protector of religious 
minorities  
 Absence of independent judiciary 
 Vagueness of Laws 
 Role of State in upholding rule of law 
 
 Independent Judiciary 
 Constitution 
 Role of State in upholding law and 
order 
 Thoroughness of the Laws and judicial 
process aimed towards fairness in trial  
 Failure of the State to respect local laws 
and instead manufacture legal decisions 
based on international pressure 
International Lens 
 International terrorists 
 Human Rights activists 
 Human Rights conventions and 
commitments 
 Cases of integration and respect for 
diversity in Europe and America 
 West attacking local traditions 
 West attacking Islam 
 West, Scandinavian countries, Europe 
protecting blasphemers  
 Rationalism as Western propaganda 
 
Observations on ontology. There are many similarities between the ontological 
representations in the two newspapers. This is incredibly insightful for the columnists 
belonging to either newspaper share the understanding of authorities recognized by their 
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respective audiences. This similarity is slightly puzzling, for the target audience of both 
newspapers are polar-opposites in terms of economic conditions, social stature, religious 
tendencies, level of education and degree of culturalism and traditionalism. And yet, both 
largely share the same understanding of authorities. Hence, in a way, the society might not be 
as fractured as thought to be. The disparities emerge mostly out of ideological differences. 
For example, while using authorities under the “Religion/Religious Authorities,” the Daily 
Jang columnists focus more on spirituality in history in the form of religious miracles and 
interpretation of religious histories than the Dawn columnists.  
Similarly, under “Historical accounts,” the Dawn columnists offer Jinnah’s 11th 
August 1946 speech as proof of his aspirations of a secular state. On the other hand, the Daily 
Jang columnists paint Jinnah as a deeply religious person. They also give accounts of 
historical figures like Salaudin Ayubi, combining history with religious identity as shown by 
Qadir (2014). Each engage in narratives that appeal to the opposite ideology. For instance, 
the Dawn columnists insist that religious scholars did not agree to the final form of the 
Blasphemy Laws. On the contrary, Daily Jang columnists detail how the proceedings were 
spearheaded and approved by liberal politicians. Throughout the narrative, all columnists 
appeal for the upholding of the legal and constitutional system of Pakistan. For the Dawn 
columnists, the need to ensure the rights of minorities and eventually, in timeline C, ensuring 
the writ of the State is more important. For the Daily Jang columnists, the opposition to the 
Blasphemy Laws is criticized for they were included into the constitution through legal 
processes. The most obvious disparity comes in the narratives on ‘International Lens’. Here, 
the Dawn columnists are more concerned about Pakistan’s impression to the world, its 
commitment to international conventions, its track record of human rights etc. For the Daily 
Jang columnists, the international community seems to be invading force attacking religious, 
cultural, nationalist and social ideologies of the country. However, even with all the 
similarities and differences, the engaging of authorities stays consistent. As was observed 
with imageries, the reliance on ontology surpasses all divisions within the society, and 
confirms it as an important component of epistemic work as stated by Alasuutari & Qadir 
(2014).      
Chapter 7.2.2: Actor Identifications. The second object of epistemic work is 
pleading to the actors’ identifications. As an object of epistemic work, the identifications 
contribute by providing a lens to understanding a situation. People’s understanding of 
themselves impacts the way they approach a situation. Their reactions are subject to their 
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identification with their understanding of what their role is in the social world and how it falls 
in line with the other roles and environments of the world. In the columns of Dawn and Daily 
Jang, the columnists are seen to engage certain identification of their readership. Yet again, 
the core categories recognized initially were limited to: Muslim, Pakistani, civilized or a 
combination of these. However, an in-depth analysis of the data revealed more concrete and 
specific identifications. These identifications exhibit the expectations of the columnists; that 
is: how they believe their audience identifies. These assumptions help shape the  arguments 
so that the message resonates with the assumed identifications.   
Actor’s and Identifications 
Dawn Daily Jang 
 Gullible Muslims 
 Law Abiding citizen 
 Rational 
 Civilized  
 Modern 
 Courageous Pakistani prone to religious 
intimidation 
 Pakistani national a subject to the State’s 
decisions 
 Pakistani national who admires Jinnah 
 Majority 
 Minority 
 Just 
 International individual 
 Muslim-ness 
 
 
 Law Abiding citizen 
 Muslim-ness 
 International individual 
 Pakistani national a subject to the State’s 
decisions 
 Protector of Islam 
 Protector of Traditions 
 Pakistani prone to propaganda from Liberal 
Fascists, Secular, West 
 Pakistani national who admires Jinnah 
 Pakistani national who admires Iqbal 
 Majority 
 Minority 
 Just 
 Rational 
 Gullible Muslims 
 Moral 
 Civilized  
 
Readership across both newspapers are thought by their columnists to identify to 
different traits. They clearly associate traits to their readership and shape their narratives 
accordingly. Yet again, there are many similarities between the two newspapers. For 
example, each newspaper audience is expected to be a law-abiding citizen or one who 
encourages democratic principles. However, the expectations -the norms and values-  out of 
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these identities vary and will be dealt with later. Similarly, nationalism much like 
religiousness is integral and a very important type of actor identifications. The disparities 
amongst the narratives come about due to the different imageries the actors are thought to 
imagine. For example, for columnists in Dawn believe that their audience must compete 
against a ‘violent religious right’ whereas, the Daily Jang columnists fear the propaganda by 
‘liberal fascists’. Yet again, the most insightful realization of these clusters of actor 
identifications is this: seeking identification is a normal method of discourse for columnists 
irrespective of their audience or personal ideologies. The columnists from Dawn and Daily 
Jang jointly assume this and form narratives that resonate with these identifications. 
 Chapter 7.2.3: Norms and Values. Norms and Values are the third component of 
“objects of epistemic work.” These are, yet again, assumed associations. The target audience 
is assumed to hold principles and values that shape their reactions to situations. There exists a 
general ideal of what the audience embraces as a norm; the normal way to proceed forward, 
to act or to think. This falls in line with their actor identifications and in a way, makes a route 
plan of exactly how a message would be deciphered and reacted upon by a certain 
combination. Columnists much like everyone else, also understand this relationship and write 
narratives that can fall in line with these norms and values. The data exhibits a number of 
norms and values that are listed below. Unlike ontology or actor identification, there were no 
presumed categories for this object of epistemic work. This is because the norms and values 
are most obvious in the initial narratives, arguments and presumed reactions of the audience 
dictated by columnists. Hence, the collection of norms and values could only be made after 
thoroughly going through all the data. 
 
Norms and Values 
Dawn Daily Jang 
 Values proper knowledge 
 Values Islamic teachings 
 Values the sovereignty of the state 
 Values Justice, Judiciary and Judicial 
Processes 
 Values Freedom 
 Values Independence 
 Values Honour 
 Values Islamic teachings 
 Values Justice, Judiciary and Judicial 
Processes 
 Values Independence 
 Values culture 
 Values Traditions 
 Values sovereignty of self-identity 
 Values historical lineage 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
60 
 
 Values Dignity 
 Values International commitments and 
regulations 
 Values progressiveness 
 Values patriotism 
 Values historical lineage 
 Values democratic principles 
 Values democratic principles 
 Values Rationality 
 Values morality 
 Values Freedom 
 Values Honour 
 Values Dignity 
 Values patriotism 
 
 
Both newspapers find norms and values that they assume their readerships hold. Most of 
these are implied and hence encompass a natural reaction to the information included in the 
narratives. There are obvious similarities between the two newspapers. The only stark 
difference found is yet again based on the imagery of a competing propogandist international 
community due to which the columnists in Daily Jang emphasize that the audience values 
self-identity. Moreover, the Dawn columnists seem to believe in the norm of progress 
whereas it is largely missing in the Daily Jang narratives. However, beyond that, the clusters 
are similar even if the interpretations are different. For example, each newspaper values 
“rationality” however, the understanding of what it implies differs. Similarly, the 
understanding of legal system and the role of the state differs. As with all the other objects of 
epistemic governance and imageries, there exists no distinction in the use of ‘Norms and 
Values’ between the newspapers. The polar audiences yet again exhibit similar expectations 
and further cement the fact that epistemic governance is a natural way to pursue narratives 
(Alasuutari & Qadir 2014).  
 Chapter 7.3: World cultures in the discourse on the Blasphemy Laws 
The Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan exist not because of the political realities of the country but 
because of how they harmonize into the social constructs of Pakistanis. Religion too acts as a 
form of world culture (Thomas 2007) for it contextualizes our situations and helps us develop 
our reactions to them. Explained by Robertson (1970) as “a cultural schema that depicts a 
super-empirical realty which empirical reality drives significance and meaning from,” 
religion too acts as a modus operandi to living for many civilizations. Hence, religious 
traditions tend to affect the environment available for actors to exist. For example, when 
religious parties take the capital hostage after the execution of Qadri, they shape the social 
reality of the country. Just as they do when they garland the murderer or idolize him. Of 
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course, the impacts of these actions are not limited to Pakistan alone. Their attitudes set 
precedents for similar occurrences across the world. In all these ways, the religious right 
shape the emerging world society (Thomas 2002). This was also observed by Qadir (2016) in 
his analysis of how Ahmadi persecution spread from South Asia to South Africa.  
However, what is important to note here is that the individual himself is a construct of 
the society (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). Hence the movements trying to impose 
fundamentalism and those restricting it, solely act out of the world society context. In the 
same manner, to better understand the role of religion in the environment of global 
rationalism, the world society, especially the civil society must be seen as a dynamic moral 
project. Society takes the form that it does after an engagement between the opposite ends of 
the spectrum. Each side attempts to project its point of view at large seeking to impact the 
state infrastructure and using it as a pulpit to announce its interpretation of the situation. This 
is especially obvious in the case of religion where the announcements define morality of not 
just the “self,” but of the state as well. Hence, the columnist take upon themselves to define 
what is right and what is wrong using religious dogmas and citations. More interestingly, they 
infuse religion with historical accounts and form new narratives that lead to moral lessons. 
This however is not a one-way street. Just as religion defines morality to the world, the world 
too changes religion. By coming into conflict with global narrative of religious freedom, the 
religious right in Pakistan hence has no other solution but to reshape itself to the needs of the 
new environment. The reshaping does not solely come in the form of a sacrifice but in fact 
can also be seen as a sharper, more aggressive stance while relying on the blind faith of 
spiritualism. For example, the columnists while insisting that the Laws are spiritual and hence 
are more supreme than man-made laws, continue to use the constitution of the country as 
arguments towards supporting them (described in detail below). Or, on the contrary, the 
columnists in Daily Jang completely disregard the expectations of the world and insist that 
the Laws are an internal matter. Hence, in these engagements, a person, or the civil society at 
large can become both religious as well as relatively secular depending on which global 
narrative, which world cultural script they adhere to.  
As observed in the data there is an obvious clash of different world cultures. There is 
Pakistan, a country that has committed to numerous human rights conventions out of, what 
seems, sheer fashion (Thomas 2009; Alasuutari, P. et al, 2014). These conventions stand at 
loggerheads with local traditions and perceptions, such as the Blasphemy Laws, that strongly 
contradict them. Pressurized by social dynamics of the country, subsequent governments 
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continue to uphold the Laws and allow state infrastructure to target accused blasphemers. 
These Laws are clear proof of how the country has decoupled from its commitments, leaving 
the conventions merely customary (Meyer et al., 1997). The Laws themselves are mere tools 
used by agents to engage a social discourse in line with perceived imageries of the world. By 
basing their arguments on these imageries, these agents manage to resonate with the populace 
and stay relevant, politically or otherwise. 
Furthermore, the protectors of the Laws see the world as constantly dereligionizing by 
giving into forces of secularism. They gain their most support by emphasizing the imagery 
that the west/ world/ seculars seek to replace religion with narratives of rationalism. They 
manage to massage this insecurity making themselves essential protectors of religion and 
local traditions. However, this is simply not true. As stated above, Thomas (2007) concludes 
that “the world is as religious today as it is secular.” This realization breaks down their 
imagery of a constantly fainting religious existence, in effect making their efforts 
unnecessary.  
As seen in the data, the narratives seem to imply that Pakistan is a unique case. The 
columnists interloop traditions with historical accounts, supernatural miracles, legal protocols 
in order to exhibit how the Blasphemy Laws, and the conflict surrounding them, are truly 
Pakistani in nature. Similarly, these agents imply that the social discourse is a result of an 
infusion of religious identity and nationalism; a combination that is prided to be unique. And 
yet, the analysis of the data proves otherwise. By breaking down narratives in obvious 
imageries and objects of epistemic work, the thesis proves that the social discourse around 
the Laws follows the very generic processes of epistemic governance (Alasuutari & Qadir 
2014). The categories observed, the imageries and objects of epistemic work identified, are 
not unique in nature. In fact, the same categories can be observed everywhere where Laws 
such as the Blasphemy Laws would come into conflict with a human rights discourse. This 
implicit embracing of epistemic governance is a representation of world culture which has 
deeply penetrated the cultural schema of the country. 
However, the process of epistemic governance is not the only representation of world 
culture trends observed in the data. When appealing to the readers, columnist who evidently 
disregard ‘worldly’ laws still use the constitution of Pakistan to support their arguments. For 
example, numerous columnists insisted that the Blasphemy Laws were implemented after a 
thorough legal process and hence those who oppose them are simply against the constitution 
of the country which, in return, labels them as traitors. Both the constitution and nationality 
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are world culture traits. They only make sense as long as one believes in the authority and 
legality of the other 194 constitutions in the world. Hence, even though these columnists seek 
to interpret their actions in local contexts in order to undermine influence from the outside 
world, they are simultaneously acknowledging the world cultures around the debate. 
Similarly, the same columnists interpret their discourse through the ‘international 
lens’ while simultaneously trying to detach themselves from it. An abundant proportion of the 
columnists from Dawn do the exact opposite by, instead, seeping international commitments, 
expectations and supra-territorial relations into the debate. There is an obvious representation 
of international discourse in the narratives of the Dawn columnists as well. The fact that 
narratives from both the newspapers dedicate a significant amount of energy to speak through 
the ‘international lens’ is proof of the interdependent world Robertson (2008, p.49) spoke 
about. Yet again, a dialogue within the context of an international setting is an example of 
world culture. 
The columnists from Dawn are seen to imply that the country needs to become more 
progressive. They do so by comparing its track record against internationally recognized 
benchmarks. This comparison is another example of the embracing of a world culture. 
Pakistan too is walking the same path that countries all over the world have either walked 
already or hope to walk soon: the walk towards progressiveness. All societies, worldwide 
exhibit rhetoric discourse to evolve the country into the global expectation of 
progressiveness. Pakistan too is seen to pursue this, show casing another case of embracing of 
world culture.    
Chapter 7.4: Gender Analysis 
Of the 151 citations used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 13 citations were from female 
columnists. Out of the 13, five were in Daily Jang and the rest were in Dawn. The five 
citations in Daily Jang all belonged to one columnist who is the wife of the head of the 
biggest religious party in Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami. As for the 8 citations of Dawn, they 
were from columns by 3 female authors with two of them cited thrice and one cited twice. 
Indeed, the count is depressing after all 48.6% of Pakistan’s population is female53. The 
reasons for this low count could be many. There is the obvious literacy difference but more 
importantly, it does display that not many women are either interested or feel themselves 
capable of dealing with narratives on the Laws. After all, many women writers are writing in 
the media on other different topics. The angst pertaining to this ‘disassociation’ is reflected in 
                                                          
53 WorldBank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS 
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one of the columnist’s complaint on Aasia Bibi’s accusation where she insisted that the over-
worked women, instead of getting together, fought bitterly and accused one of their own of 
blasphemy (E24122010_1a). Similarly, the literate women writers and columnists of Pakistan 
can indeed redirect their attention towards writing on the Laws especially for Aasia Bibi as 
she is the first woman in the history of Pakistan to be awarded a death penalty for blasphemy.  
Chapter 7.5: Further findings: The mythical origins of the nation 
The data, besides being insightful about epistemic governance, also reveals some other 
findings. One very interesting such finding is the mythical interpretations of the leading 
historical figures of the country, Jinnah and Iqbal. A significant amount of scholarship has 
been dedicated within Pakistan to paint these two historical celebrities in shades of what is 
required for the nation. The country has been questioning its existence from the very start. 
Why was Pakistan founded? There are two major answers to this question. One is that the 
country was founded for the Muslim population so that they could live their lives 
independently without facing the problems that come with being a permanent minority. The 
second answer to the same question is this: the country was founded for the Muslim 
population so that they could live their lives independently according to the tenants of Islam. 
Proponents of each answer have been engaging with each other since the very beginning of 
Pakistani years. Each side has it’s stack of ontologies which they use to engage and convince 
future generations. These arguments have since re-imaged what has been known about Jinnah 
and Iqbal. Both seem to want a state that is in line with both the camps. Each camp collects 
quotations, speeches, poetry, historical accounts to prove that Jinnah and Iqbal wanted their 
version of Pakistan. There are of course visuals to support this divide. A simple web image 
search of Jinnah would reveal, amongst others, pictures where the man is either dressed in a 
sharp suit, smoking a cigarette, holding his dogs; or him dressed in a traditional sherwani, 
donning a fur qaraqul (a skull cap named after him), praying in a congregation.  To observe 
this disparity for Jinnah, one needs not to go beyond comparing narratives of him in any 
government sponsored historical book and Jalal’s (1994) description. 
This can also be observed in the obfuscation surrounding the two in the data collected 
for this thesis. Jinnah, for example, is constantly referred by the Dawn columnists as having 
wanted a secular state. They refer to his 11th August 1946 speech and insist that, with the 
present version of Pakistan, they have betrayed their founder. They rely on a liberal, anti-
Islamic law in Pakistan by drawing on Jinnah. On the contrary, there are accounts in Daily 
Jang columns which insist that Jinnah was a deeply religious person who was always ba-
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waduh (in ablution) and offered ‘tahajjud’ prayers. Each of these columnists firmly believe in 
their version of Jinnah and disregard the opposite. Jinnah being the ultimate expression of 
nationalism builds up on their definition of patriotism. Similarly, just as Dawn columnists 
insist that they have betrayed the founder’s vision due to the imposition of laws such as the 
Blasphemy Laws, the Daily Jang columnists insist that Jinnah defended Ilm-ud-din’s case 
and hence supported the Laws. Yet again, the version of Jinnah one believes in meticulously 
defines and ties the version of country one wants. 
The same is applicable for Iqbal, who is extensively used by the Daily Jang 
columnists and shown to be a very religious person. There are many accounts of Iqbal being 
extremely sensitive about blasphemy in the columns in Daily Jang. Similarly, there are 
accounts of him being impressed by Ilm-ud-din’s action. Iqbal being the philosophical father 
of the country is as important in the country’s history as is Jinnah. It is no understatement if 
the two are taken as the two main pillars of Pakistan’s ideology. Hence, by referring to Iqbal 
and his devotion to the anti-blasphemy movement, the Daily Jang columnists manage to 
strongly emphasize that the present Laws are in line with the aspirations of Iqbal. And yet, 
while no Dawn columnist uses a contrary version of Iqbal to support their arguments, a 
considerable amount of scholarly work is available that offers another version of Iqbal. For 
example, Fateh (2008, p.12) offers a version of Iqbal where he is in favor of Ataturk’s 
abolition of the caliphate and appreciative of his secular version of Islam and ruling.   
The differentiated use of these two historical personalities is just a scratch on the 
surface of a country that’s filled with ‘banal nationalism’ (Billing 1995). There is a mythical 
element attached to them just as it is to the very origins of the founding of Pakistan. The 
historical narratives are shrouded with mystery and heroism. Most of these accounts fall short 
of giving the true picture. The contradictions are obvious and yet, people continue believing 
in their versions of realities. In that sense, the nation itself is an imagined community that 
firmly believes in its uniqueness, sovereignty and individual identity. People of Pakistan 
firmly believe in their unique traits and history as a community. They appeal to figures, 
historical or otherwise and paint them in narratives of heroism and mystery so that they 
appeal to their versions of beliefs. The cultural infusion attached to somewhat ambiguous 
historical accounts (after all history has many versions, each truer and false than the other) of 
Jinnah and Iqbal cultivates a deeper sense of this ‘banal nationalism’ similar to Alasuutari 
(2013) observations. This mythology is the essence of such an identity and figuring out where 
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and when these heroic versions of the founding and philosophical fathers of the country 
developed has potential for interesting future research. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The study sought to recognize the different discourses used by Pakistani society to 
either rationalize or condemn the Blasphemy Laws. This was successfully done using the 
epistemic governance approach via which the narratives in the columns of the leading 
newspapers of the country were broken down into imageries and objects of epistemic work. It 
was surprising to note that even though the two newspapers catered to somewhat polar-
opposite segments of the society, they still mostly followed the same route to epistemically 
govern their readership. Similar forms of imageries and authorities were employed with each 
side latching their own content to them. Everyone, hence, was talking in the same way with 
some interesting variations which were pointed out in the analysis. The findings of the thesis 
offer much insight into the way column writers phrase their narratives to convince the 
readership of their opinions. The imageries identified show what the writers believe is the 
reality recognized by their readers. The categories of authorities discovered in the narratives 
offer insight on the expected categorization on conversations on laws similar to the 
Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan. In that sense, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that any 
discourse around such laws elsewhere would also use the support of these categories of 
authorities. This realization will have implications on many levels. For Pakistan, the study 
identifies the imageries of that segment of the society that reads these two newspapers. As 
they are the most widely read newspapers in each language, the patterns can be expected to 
repeat in the column pieces of other newspapers as well (Gobo 2008). In that sense, the 
reader of this study can get a representation of imageries of the segment of Pakistan’s society 
that can read. The categories of authorities and objects of epistemic work identified can help 
guide policy makers to shape their narratives to bring the conversation on Blasphemy Laws 
forward. The same application can be done on any religious laws across the world. The study 
gives an understanding of how the narratives need to be shaped and particular authorities 
need to be employed in order to best contextualize debates in the perceived realities of their 
audience. Finally, the study builds up on the work done by Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) and 
confirms the role and importance of epistemic governance in forming narratives. 
The study also recognized the numerous world forces at play that blend into each other to 
form what Pakistan firmly believes as it’s unique social identity. This confirms the claim of 
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numerous world cultural scholars of the abundance and similarity of trends across 
geographies. Finally, the heroism painted on historical figures offered insight onto how easily 
one could believe in their version of reality and how manufactured history could cement such 
details. All in all, the study managed to sought out what it aspired to do. The reader of this 
study will be well-versed on the history and evolution of the Blasphemy Laws of Pakistan 
and will also manage to see how the Pakistani society forms the social constructs around the 
debate on them. The reader would also be able to better form their own narratives in order to 
engage in epistemic governance with anyone who believes in similar laws anywhere in the 
world. The study hence makes policy makers more apt to discuss religiously motivated 
controversial laws. It is hoped that someone, somewhere makes good use of the potential of 
these findings and manages to change a narrative that has, as yet, proven unchangeable. 
  
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
68 
 
Chapter 9: References 
 
Abbas, S. B. (2013) Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws: From Islamic Empires to the Taliban. Texas: 
University of Texas Press. 
Ahmed, A. S. (1997) Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic identity: The search for Saladin. London: 
Routledge. 
Akhtar, R. S., (2009) Media, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, OUP: Karachi 
Alasuutari P. & Qadir A. (2014) “Epistemic governance: an approach to the politics of policy-
making”, European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 1:1, 67-84 
Alasuutari P., & Qadir A. (2016) “Imageries of the social world in epistemic governance’, 
International Sociology, 31 (6): 633-652 
Alasuutari, P. (2004) Social Theory and Human Reality. London: Sage Publications. 
Alasuutari, P. (2011). The governmentality of consultancy and competition: The influence of the 
OECD. In G. Solinís & N. Baya-Laffite (Eds.), Mapping out the research-policy matrix: 
Highlights from the First International Forum on the Social Science-Policy Nexus: 147–
165. Paris: UNESCO 
Alasuutari, P. (2013) Spreading global models and enhancing banal localism: the case of local 
government cultural policy development, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 19(1): 
103-119 
Alasuutari, P. (2014) Following the Example of Other Countries? Policy Analysis of New 
Legislation in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 16(3): 266-279 
Ali, T. (2002). The clash of fundamentalism: Crusades, jihad and modernity. London: Verso 
Amnesty International (2016) “As good as dead”. Pg. 14 Retrieved from: 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/585a41704.pdf 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
69 
 
An, S.K. & Gower, K.K. (2009) ‘How do the news media frame crises? A content analysis of 
crisis news coverage’, Public Relations Review, 35, 107–12 
Aziz, K. K. (1967) The making of Pakistan: A study in Nationalism. London: Chatto and Windus 
Ltd. 
Bibi, A. & Tollet, A. I. (2013) Blasphemy: A memoir, Sentenced to death over a cup of water. 
Chicago: Chicago Review Press. 
Bindra S., S. (1990) Politics of Islamization: with special reference to Pakistan. New Delhi: Deep 
& Deep publications. 
Boli, J and Thomas, G. M.  (1997). ‘World Culture in the World Polity:  A Century of 
International Non-Governmental Organization.’  American Sociological Review 62 (2): 
171-190 
Bukhair, S. (2015) ‘Comparative Study of Urdu and English Newspaper Headlines of Pakistan: 
Different Representation, Same News’, International Journal of Humanities and Social 
Science, 5:10(1) 
Fair, C. C., Kaltenthaler, K. & Miller, W. (2015) Pakistani Political Communication and Public 
Opinion on US Drone Attacks, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38:6, 852-872 
Charmaz, K. (2008) Reconstructing Grounded Theory In Alasuutari et al (Ed.), The Sage 
handbook of Social research methods (461-478). London: Sage Publications Ltd 
Devji, F. (2013) Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a political idea. London: C. Hurst & Co (Publishers) 
Ltd.  
Dobbin F., Simmons B. & Garret G. (2007) “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social 
Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning? “, Annual Review of Sociology, 33: 
449-472. 
Eilders, C., & Lüter, A., (2000) ‘Research notes: Germany at war, competing framing strategies 
in German Public Discourse’, European Journal of Communication, 15(3): 415-428  
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
70 
 
Fair, C. & Hamza, A. (2016) ‘From elite consumption to popular opinion: framing of the US 
drone program in Pakistani newspapers’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:4, 578-607 
Fairclough N. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Polity Press. 
Fairclough, I. & Fairclough, N. (2013) Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced 
Students. London: Routledge 
Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. (1997) Critical discourse analysis. In T. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse 
as Social Interaction. 2, 258-284. London: Sage 
Fateh, T. (2008) Chasing a mirage: The tragic illusion of Islamic State. Canada: John Wiley & 
Sons Canada, Ltd. 
Gobo, G. (2008). Re-conceptualizing generalization: Old issues in a new frame. In P. Alasuutari. 
L. Bickman, & J. Brannen (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of social research methods ( 193-
213). London: Sage 
Golan G., (2006) ‘Inter-media agenda setting and global news coverage’, Journalism Studies7(2): 
323–333 
Haque, N.U. & Sheikh, A. (1994) ‘Concerns of Intelligentsia in Pakistan: Content Analysis of 
Newspapers’, Economic and Political Weekly, 29 (24) 1482-1486 
Hassan, F. (2006) Pakistan's Federal Structure and the Constitution of 1973, The Muslim World 
96(2): 269-286 
Held, David and McGrew, Anthony editor. 2000. The Global Transformation Reader. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Hussian, A., K. (2015) From Sufism to Ahmadiyya: A muslim minority movement in South 
Asia. Indiana: Indiana University Press 
IMS (2009) Between radicalization and democratization in an unfolding conflict: Media in 
Pakistan, published online July 2009. 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
71 
 
Iqbal, A., Ali, Z., Fatima, S., & Naseem, S., (2013) ‘Comparative Analysis of Editorial 
Treatment by Urdu Press of Pakistan Regarding Elections 2008’, The International Asian 
Research Journal 01(01): 46-58 
Ispahani, F. (2017). Purifying the land of the pure: A history of Pakistan’s religious minorities. 
New York: Oxford University Press 
Jalal, A. (1994) The sole spokesperson: Jinnah, the Muslim league and the demand for Pakistan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Jalal, A. (2014) The struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim homeland and global politics. London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Jawad, S. 2008. “The Representation of Cultural Diversity in Urdu-Language Newspapers in 
Pakistan: A Study of Daily Jang and Nawaiwaqt”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian 
Studies 31 (2)  
Jaynes S., (2015) "Making strategic change: a critical discourse analysis", Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 28(1): 97-116, doi: 10.1108/JOCM-04-2013-0053 
Jossep B. (2016) The State: Past, present and future. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Julius, Q. (2016) “The Experience of Minorities Under Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws” Islam and 
Christian–Muslim Relations, 27:1, 95-115, DOI:10.1080/09596410.2015.1108639 
Kennedy, C., H. (1989) Towards the Definition of a Muslim in a Islamic State: The Case of the 
Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. In Vajpey, D. (EdS.), Religious and Ethnic Minority Politics in 
South Asia (pp. 71-108). New Delhi: Manohar 90. 
Khan, N. (2012) Muslim becoming: Aspiration and Skepticism in Pakistan. London: Duke 
University Press. 
Lau, M. (1994) Introduction to the Pakistani Legal System, with Special Reference to the Law of 
Contract, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online, 1(1): 3-28. 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
72 
 
Lecheler, S., Keer, M., Schuck, A.R.T. and Hänggli, R., (2015) “The Effects of repetitive news 
Framing on Political Opinions over Time.” Communication Monographs, published 
online 21 January  
Long, D.R. (2009) ‘Dawn and the creation of Pakistan’, Media History, 15(4): 407–21 
Luke, A. (1997). Theory and practice in critical science discourse. In L. Saha (Ed.), International 
encyclopedia of the sociology of education (pp. 50-56). NY: Pergamon 
Meyer, J.W., Boli, J., Thomas, G.M. and Ramirez, F.O. (1997) ‘World Society and the Nation-
state’, The American Journal of Sociology 103: 144–81. 
Meyer, J. W. & Bromley, P. 2013 “The Worldwide Expansion of ''Organization”, Sociological 
Theory. 31:366 
Meyer, J.W. & R.L. Jepperson. (2000). The "Actors" of Modern Society: The Cultural 
Construction of Social Agency. Sociological Theory 18 (1): 100-20. 
Nadadur R.D. (2007) ‘Self-Censorship in the Pakistani print media’, South Asian Survey 14:1, 
45-63 
Nawaz, S. (1983) ‘The Mass Media and Development in Pakistan’ Asian Survey, 23(8) 934-957 
Newberg, P. R. (1995) Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Noorani , A. G.,(2012)  “Jinnah’s August 11, 1947 Speech,” Criterion Quarterly 5(2) 
Pieterse, Jan N. 2013. “What is Global Studies?” Globalizations, 2013 10 (4) 
Qadir, A. & Alasuutari, P. (2013): Taming terror: domestication of the war on terror in the 
Pakistan media, Asian Journal of Communication 
Qadir, A. (2015) ‘When Heterodoxy Becomes Heresy: Using Bourdieu's Concept of Doxa to 
describe state-sanctioned exclusion in Pakistan’, Sociology of religion 76(2): 155-176 
Qadir, A. (2016) How heresy makes orthodoxy: The sedimentation of Sunnism in the Ahmadi 
cases of South Africa. Sociology of Islam 4 (4): 345-67. 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
73 
 
Qadir, A. (2014) Parliamentary Herecticization of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan: The Modern 
World Implicated in Islamic Crisis. In Ganiel, G., Winkel, H. & Monnot, C. (Ed.), 
Religion in times of Crisis, 135-152. Netherlands: Printforce. 
Robertson, R. (1992) ‘Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture’. London: Sage. --- 1970. 
The Sociological interpretation of Religion. New York: Schocken 
Rosenfeld, S. (2000) ‘The column pages as a step to a better democracy’, Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics. 5(1): 7–12 
Saeed, R. (2013) “Metamorphosis of the Ideals and the Actuals: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan and 
the Transplantation of Justice in British India”, Degruyter 7 (2) 235-247 
Scholte, J. A. (2005) Globalization: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave 
Shabir, G. & Iqbal, Z. (2010) “Media Construction of Pakistan‟s Image: Discourse Analysis of 
Editorials of the Elite UK Newspapers” China Media Research. 6(3), 48-56.  
Shah, D. V., m. D. Watts, D. Domke, and D. P. Fan. (2002) “news Framing and Cueing of Issue 
regimes: Explaining Clinton’s Public Approval In Spite Of Scandal.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 66(3): 339–70 
Shakir, N. (2015) ‘Islamic Shariah and Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan’ The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2015.1053235 
Shoeb, N.F., (2008) ‘An Analysis of Urdu and English Editorial Coverage of the 2007 
Emergency from Pakistani Newspapers’ (master’s thesis), Georgetown University. 
Retrieved from: 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/552894/shoebNadia.pdf
;sequence=1 
Singh, J. (2009) Jinnah: India- Partition- Independence. New Delhi: Rupa & Co. 
Smith, M. J. (1999). Contemporary Communication Research Methods.  California: Wordsworth 
Publishing Company 
Epistemic Governance in the Discourse Around the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A review 
of columns in Dawn and Daily Jang 
 
74 
 
Sommer B. & Maycroft J.R., (2008) ‘Influencing public policy: An analysis of published column 
by academics’, Politics and Policy 36(4): 586–613 
Supreme court of Pakistan (2015) The State vs Malik Mumtaz Qadri. P. 26 retrieved from 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Crl.A._210_2015.pdf 
Swiss, L. (2009) “Decoupling Values from Action: An Event-history Analysis of the Election of 
Women to Parliament in the Developing World, 1945-90” International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 50 (1): 69-95  
Taseer, S. (1980) Bhutto: A political biography. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 
Thomas, G. M. (2002( “Religious movements, world civil society, and social theory” Hedgehog 
Review 4: 50-65. 
Thomas, G. M. (2004) “Constructing world civil society through contentions over religious 
rights” Journal of Human Rights 3 (2): 239-251 
Thomas, G. M. (2009) “World Polity, World Culture, World Society” International Political 
Sociology 3 (1):115-119 
Van Dijk, T. A. (1988). News as discourse. Hillside, NJ: Erlbaum 
Van Dijk, T.A. (1977) Current Trends in Textlinguisitics (Berlin/Newyork: De Gruyter) 
Waterman, D. (2014) ‘Saudi wahhabi imperialism in Pakistan: history, legacy, contemporary 
representations and debate’, Socialinių Mokslų Studijos Societal Studies, 6(2): 242-258 
Wynbrandt, J. (2009) A brief history of Pakistan. USA: Facts on File, Inc.
75 
 
Appendix 
 CODE AUTHOR NEWSPAPER DATE TITLE GENDER 
1.  E20112010_1a Irfan husain Dawn 20112010 Venting my spleen M 
2.  E25122010_1a I.A. Rehman Dawn 25122010 The blasphemy law M 
3.  E30122010_1a Kamran Shafi Dawn 30122010 Our lovely image M 
4.  E31122010_1a Irfan husain Dawn 31122010 Analyzing Pakistan’s DNA M 
5.  E04012011_1a Rafia Zakaria Dawn 04012011 The path of silence F 
6.  U29112010_2a Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi Jang 29112010 Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai 
aur kyu zaroori hai? II 
F 
7.  U28112010_2a Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi Jang 28112010 Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai 
aur kyu zaroori hai? 
F 
8.  U30112010_2a Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi Jang 30112010 Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai 
aur kyu zaroori hai? III 
F 
9.  U29112010_1a Hamid Mir Jang 29112010 Inshallah Fatah humari hogi M 
10.  E11012011_1b Mahir Ali Dawn 11012011 Hate crimes and their aftermath M 
11.  E13012011_1b Cyril Almeida Dawn 13012011 Tactical retreat or total defeat? M 
12.  E28012011_1b Cyril Almeida Dawn 28012011 Culture warriors M 
13.  E07012011_2b Kuldip Nayar Dawn 07012011 Time to begin a dialogue M 
14.  E11012011_1b Mahir Ali Dawn 11012011 Hate crimes and their aftermath M 
15.  E13012011_1b Cyril Almeida Dawn 13012011 Tactical retreat or total defeat? M 
16.  E15012011_2b Irfan husain Dawn 15012011 Might is right, according to the 
right 
M 
17.  E07012011_1b Irfan husain Dawn 07012011 Blaming the victim M 
18.  E05012011_1b Jawed Naqvi Dawn 05012011 Who are we dying to please? M 
19.  E28012011_1b Cyril Almeida Dawn 28012011 Culture warriors M 
20.  E10012011_1b Kamran Shafi Dawn 10012011 A cry in the wilderness M 
21.  E31012011_1b Kamran Shafi Dawn 31012011 Cutting off the nose… M 
22.  E09022011_1b I.A. Rehman Dawn 09022011 No security in fear M 
23.  E07012011_1b Irfan husain Dawn 07012011 Blaming the victim M 
24.  E06012011_1b Cyril Almeida Dawn 06012011 Who will fight back? M 
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25.  E07012011_1b Irfan husain Dawn 07012011 Blaming the victim M 
26.  E03032011_1b XXXXXXX Dawn 03032011 Minorities in Islam - 
27.  E15012011_2b Irfan husain Dawn 15012011 Might is right, according to the 
right 
M 
28.  E07012011_1b Irfan husain Dawn 07012011 Blaming the victim M 
29.  E14032011_1b Maajid Nawaz Dawn 14032011 A dangerous narrative M 
30.  E06012011_1b Cyril Almeida Dawn 06012011 Who will fight back? M 
31.  E10012011_1b Kamran Shafi Dawn 10012011 A cry in the wilderness M 
32.  E03032011_1b XXXXXXX Dawn 03032011 Minorities in Islam - 
33.  E03032011_1b XXXXXXX Dawn 03032011 Minorities in Islam - 
34.  E08012011_1b Nadeem F. Paracha Dawn 08012011 Smokers’ Corner: What casualties 
these are 
M 
35.  E03032011_1b XXXXXXX Dawn 03032011 Minorities in Islam - 
36.  U09012011_1b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk II M 
37.  U16012011_3b Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui Jang 16012011 Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar M 
38.  U07012011_4b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 07012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk  M 
39.  U09012011_1b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk II M 
40.  U12012011_4b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 12012011 Joshay ki haqeeqat ko na samjhe 
wo nazar kya? 
M 
41.  U10012011_2b Ansar Abassi Jang 10012011 Masla Toheen Rasalat..kiss se masfi 
chaye 
M 
42.  U16012011_3b Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui Jang 16012011 Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar M 
43.  U10012011_2b Ansar Abassi Jang 10012011 Masla Toheen Rasalat..kiss se masfi 
chaye 
M 
44.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
45.  U21012011_1b Saeed Siddiqui Jang 21012011 Sateeza kar raha hai izl se ta 
amrooz 
M 
46.  U09012011_2b Saeed Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Quied-e-Azam per Bohtaan laganay 
walay  
M 
47.  U08012011_1b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 08012011 Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai M 
48.  U08012011_2b Shafqat Mehmood Jang 08012011 Kya hum aik Munksam Qoum M 
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hain?? 
49.  U08012011_4b Arshad Ahmed Arif Jang 08012011 Bey Khatr kodd para Aatish 
Namrood Main Ishq 
M 
50.  U06012011_2b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 06012011 Aur Jo ghor nahy kartay M 
51.  U08012011_1b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 08012011 Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai M 
52.  U10012011_2b Ansar Abassi Jang 10012011 Masla Toheen Rasalat..kiss se masfi 
chaye 
M 
53.  U07012011_4b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 07012011 Ye mamlay nazuk hain M 
54.  U16012011_3b Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui Jang 16012011 Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar M 
55.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
56.  U12012011_3b Ishtiaq Baig Jang 12012011 Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat aur 
Ghazi Ilmudin Shaheed 
M 
57.  U19012011_1b Ishtiaq Baig Jang 19012011 … Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat aur 
Ghazi Ilmudin Shaheed...Aaj ki 
Duniya 
M 
58.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
59.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
60.  U16012011_3b Mohammad Saleem Siddiqui Jang 16012011 Ba-Muhammad Hoshiaar M 
61.  U06012011_2b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 06012011 Aur Jo ghor nahy kartay M 
62.  U08012011_2b Shafqat Mehmood Jang 08012011 Kya hum aik munksam Qoum 
hain?? 
M 
63.  U08012011_2b Shafqat Mehmood Jang 08012011 Kya hum aik munksam Qoum 
hain?? 
M 
64.  U12012011_1b Nazeer Naji Jang 12012011 Mutafaqa Islami Aain  M 
65.  U16012011_2b Raheem ullah Yusuf  Zy Jang 16012011 Salman Taseer Ka Katl M 
66.  U07022011_1b Hamid Mir Jang 07022011 Aafia Siddiqui aur Liberal fascism M 
67.  E01032016_1c Jawed Naqvi Dawn 01032016 Slaying Raktabeej was never easy M 
68.  E02032016_1c Rafia Zakaria Dawn 02032016 The end of Qadri F 
69.  E16032016_1c Babbar Sattar Dawn 16032016 In defense of Qadri verdict M 
70.  E05032016_1c Abbas Nasir Dawn 05032016 The right course forward M 
71.  E09032016_1c Zahid Hussain Dawn 09032016 The state and justice M 
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72.  E04032016_1c Asha’Ar Rehman Dawn 04032016 The usual scenes M 
73.  E05032016_1c Abbas Nasir Dawn 05032016 The right course forward M 
74.  E13032016_1c Muhammad Amir Rana Dawn 13032016 In search of relevance M 
75.  U03032016_2c XXXXXXX Jang 03032016 Fikri Intishaar - 
76.  U05032016_1c XXXXXXX Jang 05032016 Rajaiat aur Inteha Pasandi ke 
dirmiyan Kashmakash 
- 
77.  U04032016_1c XXXXXXX Jang 04032016 Shan-e-Mustafa - 
78.  U11032016_1c XXXXXXX Jang 11032016 Murda Zameeron key Pathay huye 
kafn 
- 
79.  U04032016_1c XXXXXXX Jang 04032016 Shan-e-Mustafa - 
80.  E31122010_1a Irfan husain Dawn 31122010 Analysing Pakistan’s DNA M 
81.  E20112010_1a Irfan husain Dawn 20112010 Venting my spleen M 
82.  E25122010_1a I.A. Rehman Dawn 25122010 The blasphemy law M 
83.  U28112010_2a Doctor Samia Raheel Qazi Jang 28112010 Kannon Toheen-e-rasalat kya hai 
aur kyu zaroori hai? 
F 
84.  U07122010_1a Sarwar Ahmed Qadri Jang 07122010 Toheen-e-Rasalat..andaz-e-biyan M 
85.  U28112010_1a Nazeer Naji Jang 28112010 Khuda Ka Khof Karo M 
86.  U28112010_1a Nazeer Naji Jang 28112010 Khuda Ka Khof Karo M 
87.  E22012011_1b Ardeshir Cowasjee Dawn 22012011 Blind and stupid and savage M 
88.  E16012011_1b Ardeshir Cowasjee Dawn 16012011 Jinnah’s Pakistan? M 
89.  E16012011_1b Ardeshir Cowasjee Dawn 16012011 Jinnah’s Pakistan? M 
90.  E07012011_2b Kuldip Nayar Dawn 07012011 Time to begin a dialogue M 
91.  E30032015_1b Huma Yusuf Dawn 30032015 More than words F 
92.  E30032015_1b Huma Yusuf Dawn 30032015 More than words F 
93.  U06012011_2b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 06012011 Aur jo ghor nahy karte M 
94.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
95.  U12012011_3b Ishtiaq Baig Jang 12012011 Qanoon Toheen-e-Rasalat aur 
Ghazi Ilmudin Shaheed 
M 
96.  U09012011_2b Saeed Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Quied-e-Azam per Bohtaan laganay 
walay 
M 
97.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
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98.  U24122015_1b XXXXXXX Jang 24122015 Nabi Rehmat Salala ho Alai 
Wasalam 
- 
99.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
100.  U09012011_3b Masood Ashar Jang 09012011 Goyam Mushkil o Garna Goyam 
Mushkil 
M 
101.  E09032016_1c Zahid Hussain Dawn 09032016 The state and justice M 
102.  E25122010_1a I.A. Rehman Dawn 25122010 The blasphemy law M 
103.  U25112010_2a Arshad Ahmed Arif Jang 25112010 Zalimo..Kalima parhaney ka bhy 
ehsaan gya 
M 
104.  U25112010_1a Hamid Mir Jang 25112010 Aasia bibi aur Qanoon Toheen-e-
Rasalat 
M 
105.  E09022011_1b I.A. Rehman Dawn 09022011 No security in fear M 
106.  E26042015_1b Reema Omer Dawn 26042015 Impartial courts F 
107.  E14102015_1b Zahid Hussain Dawn 14102015 Confronting the demon M 
108.  E10042015_1b Aafiyat Nazar Dawn 10042015 No questions asked M 
109.  U08012011_1b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 08012011 Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai M 
110.  U12012011_2b Atta-ul-haq Qasmi Jang 12012011 Baat chali nikli hai ab daikhain 
kahan tak pohnchay 
M 
111.  U08012011_1b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 08012011 Ain- Jinab e Wala Aai M 
112.  U13012011_2b Ansar Abassi Jang 13012011 Qanoon Namoos-e-Rasalat- Haqaiq 
aur Propoganda 
M 
113.  U09012011_1b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk II M 
114.  U09012011_1b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk II M 
115.  U07012011_4b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 07012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk  M 
116.  U06012011_2b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 06012011 Aur jo ghor nahy kartey M 
117.  U09012011_5b Muno Bhai Jang 09012011 Insaan ka wahshat ki taraf wapsi ka 
safr 
M 
118.  U09012011_1b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 09012011 Ye mamlay hain nazuk II M 
119.  U15012011_2b Masood Asher Jang 15012011 Hum kis se kahain_ M 
120.  U06012011_2b Haroon Al-Rasheed Jang 06012011 Aur jo ghor nahy kartey M 
121.  U14102015_1b XXXXXXX Jang 14102015 Aik Ruka Huwa Faisla - 
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122.  E05032016_1c Abbas Nasir Dawn 05032016 The right course forward M 
123.  E03032016_1c Khurram Husain Dawn 03032016 Burying the assassin M 
124.  E02032016_1c Rafia Zakaria Dawn 02032016 The end of Qadri F 
125.  E13032016_1c Muhammad Amir Rana Dawn 13032016 In search of relevance M 
126.  E03032016_1c Khurram Husain Dawn 03032016 Burying the assassin M 
127.  U04032016_1c XXXXXXX Jang 04032016 Shan-e-Mustafa - 
128.  U03032016_1c XXXXXXX Jang 03032016 Mumtaz Qadri ki phansi ki itni jaldi 
kyu? 
- 
129.  E20112010_1u Irfan husain Dawn 20112010 Venting my spleen M 
130.  E24122010_1a Rafia Zakaria Dawn 24122010 A sip of water F 
131.  E27122010_1a Irfan husain Dawn 27122010 Right man for the right job M 
132.  E25122010_1a I.A. Rehman Dawn 25122010 The blasphemy law M 
133.  E20112010_1a Irfan husain Dawn 20112010 Venting my spleen M 
134.  U29112010_1a Hamid Mir Jang 29112010 Inshallah Fatah humari hogi M 
135.  U05122010_1a Syed Munawar Hussain Jang 05122010 Musalmanu ke markaz-e-mohabat 
per humla 
M 
136.  U25112010_2a Arshad Ahmed Arif Jang 25112010 Zalimo..Kalima parhaney ka bhy 
ehsaan gya 
M 
137.  U30112010_2a Dr. Samia Raheel Qazi Jang 30112010 Qanon Toheen-e-Rasalat kya hai 
aur kyu zaroori hai? III 
F 
138.  E01042015_1b Reema Omer Dawn 01042015 Vague laws F 
139.  E09012011_1b Huma Yusuf Dawn 09012011 The global response F 
140.  E04022011_1b XXXXXXX Dawn 04022011 Persecution of minorities M 
141.  E26042015_1b Reema Omer Dawn 26042015 Impartial courts F 
142.  U20012011_3b Hamid Mir Jang 20012011 Wo jo Pakistan se mayus Nahy M 
143.  U11012011_1b Irshad Ahmed Arif Iqbal Jang 11012011 Terey dais ka kya haal Sunao M 
144.  U13012011_1b Irfan Siddiqui Jang 13012011 Papa-e-Azam! Apni Hadu main 
Rahain 
M 
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